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ABSTRACT
The primary explanation for the marked rise in real wages in both England
and Flanders, from the later fourteenth to mid fifteenth centuries, was a
combination of institutional wage stickiness and deflation. In both
countries, nominal wages had indeed risen after the Black Death (1348),
but so had the cost of living, with a rampant inflation that lasted until the
late 1370s in England and the late 1380s in Flanders. Thereafter, consumer
prices fell sharply but money wages did not – or, in Flanders, not as much
as did consumer prices. The other thesis of this paper is that these later
medieval price movements were fundamentally monetary in nature.
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I. NOMINAL WAGE STICKINESS AND THE 
REAL-WAGE PROBLEM: J. M. KEYNES, ADAM SMITH,
AND THE EVIDENCE
Plaguing, so to speak, the current debate about changes in real-incomes in late-
medieval western Europe, especially during the so-called “Golden Age of the
Laborer,” following the Black Death, is the very troubling issue of “wage
stickiness.” It simply means the long-term inflexibility, especially downward
inflexibility, of nominal or money wages – and thus most emphatically not
“stickiness” in real wages. The real wage is the physical quantity of goods and
services that the artisan, craftsman or laborer can purchase with his or her
money wage plus all the material fringe benefits that this employee receives in
kind as a further payment for his/her labor: in terms of food, clothing, shelter,
and other material rewards. In most historical studies, however, the real wage
index is presented simply as the quotient of the nominal (money) wage index
divided by the consumer price index: i.e. RWI = NWI/CPI; and it thus ignores
the presence of any such fringe benefits (Van Zandem, 1999; R. Allen, 2001).
Most economists focus much more on the behavior of real wages rather than
on money wages in analyzing labor markets and the impact of labor changes
upon the economy; and that was even more true of the Classical Economists
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For reasons to be explained
later, this study focuses upon the daily money wages paid to building craftsmen
in southern England and the southern Low Countries (1300–1500) and upon
their cost of living (as measured by “basket of consumables” price indexes).
Those who neglect the significance of money wages and the historical problem
of nominal wage stickiness have ignored not only John Maynard Keynes but also
Adam Smith, the renowned founder of the Classical School. The former
commented that: “the Classical Theory has been accustomed to rest the
supposedly self-adjusting character of the economic system on an assumed fluid-
ity of money-wages; and when there is rigidity, to lay on this rigidity the blame of
maladjustment” (Keynes, 1936, p. 257). Drawing upon historical evidence, Smith
(1776/1937, p. 74) did in fact offer supporting evidence for the view that money
wages were not so fluid, cogently observing in the Wealth of Nations that:
The wages of labour do not in Great Britain fluctuate with the price of provisions, [which]
vary everywhere from year to year, frequently from month to month. But in many places
the price of labour remains uniformly the same sometimes for half a century . . .. The high
price of provisions during these ten years past has not in many parts of the kingdom been
accompanied with any sensible rise in the money price of labour.
He was not far off the mark. For, in southern England, the money wage of
master masons and carpenters had remained fixed at 24d per day (i.e. 2s 0d)
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for precisely 40 years, while the well-known “basket of consumables” composite
price index of Henry Phelps Brown and Sheila Hopkins (1955, 1956, 1981, 
p. 178) had risen, over the same 40-year period (1733–1773), by 57.4%.1 By
far the longest period of nominal wage stickiness recorded in English price-
history is to be found in the payment records for carpenters and masons at the
Oxford colleges. From 1363 to 1536, a period of 174 years, they were paid,
with very rare exceptions, a standard wage of 6d per day, or 3s 0d per six-day
week, certainly for the summer (Easter-Michaelmas) season. When they then
received their first sustained modest increase, to 6.5d and 7.0d per day in
1536–1537, they had already suffered some considerable ravages of inflation:
a 50% rise in the price level, from the well-known Price Revolution, which
had commenced around 1516–1520.2
If the continental evidence fails to provide evidence quite so impressive,
nevertheless long-term nominal wage stickiness was clearly also the prevalent
feature of labor markets in the Low Countries for the fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries. Thus, in Bruges, the daily money-wage for a civic policemen
was fixed at 5d groot Flemish (summer and winter) from 1398 to 1476,
nominally and initially half the rate for a master mason, though on an annual
payment basis about 90% as much.3 At Mechelen (a Flemish enclave within
the neighboring duchy of Brabant), the predominant daily summer wage for
master masons and carpenters in the town’s employ was an inflexible 12d groot
Brabant (= 8d groot Flemish) from the Burgundian monetary reform of 1434
to 1489 (Table 14). Such wage stability is all the more surprising in view of
the virtual doubling of prices during this period, as measured by a similar
“basket of consumables” index constructed by Herman Van der Wee (1975,
1978). From 1490 to 1540, with renewed inflation from about 1515, those
Mechelen wages were fixed at a constant 13.5d groot (= 9d groot Flemish). In
nearby Antwerp that daily summer wage of 12d groot Brabant had prevailed
for these building craftsmen for the rather shorter period, from 1442 to 1486
(Table 13).4
Consider the implications of these data on wage stickiness and prices. 
For, if we calculate the real wage index by the aforementioned formula 
(RWI = NWI/CPI), then obviously changes in the price level – the extent of
inflation or deflation – would fundamentally determine the changes in real
wages. Adam Smith (1776/1937, p. 74) himself commented that, if “the
labouring poor can maintain their families in dear years, they must be at
their ease in times of moderate plenty, and in affluence in those of extra-
ordinary cheapness.”
The most famous example of affluence was in later-medieval England, and
indeed in other parts of western Europe, following the Black Death (1348) –
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though, as will be seen, some considerable time after the several onslaughts of
bubonic plague. As Thorold Rogers (1903, p. 325) stated so long ago, and as
so many others have continually reiterated since: “the fifteenth century and the
first quarter of the sixteenth were the Golden Age of the English labourer, if
we are to interpret the wages which he earned by the cost of the necessities of
life.”5 The accompanying Tables 3–5 clearly indicate for England, at least, that
most of this so-called Golden Age was also one of prolonged deflation, with
only a few, sporadic spikes of high prices. Even the cross-Channel Low
Countries, with a much different monetary history, and one plagued by repeated
coinage debasements, experienced two prolonged periods of deflation – with
rising real wages – from c.1390 to c.1420 and again from c.1440 to c.1470
(Tables 3–4, 8–15).
Although southern England’s subsequent experience with real wages, into the
early-modern era, was not replicated, for example, in the cross-Channel Low
Countries, surely this historic pattern of real-wages is a most remarkable
experience, and one that poses serious theoretical problems for both economists
and historians. As Keynes has reminded us (1936, p. 5), one of the most basic
postulates of Classical Economics is that “the wage is equal to the marginal
product of labour;” and of course by that statement he meant the real wage. Are
we really to believe, through much of later-medieval and early-modern English
economic history, that a combination of wage-stickiness and a fluctuating price
level had a more powerful impact on real wages than did changes in the
productivity of labor and capital?6 As this study will reveal, however, the impact
of wage stickiness proved to be much more powerful during periods of defla-
tion, if only because during prolonged inflations, nominal wages were rather
less sticky, especially in the Low Countries. But even there, during the Price
Revolution era, the frequently rising money wages often did lag behind
consumer prices, and then became far more sticky during the deflationary seven-
teenth century.7
Commodity Price Indexes and Their Problems
There are of course several intractable measurement problems with all these price
and wage indexes. The prices in the Phelps Brown and Hopkins “basket of con-
sumables” for southern England, and in the other two “baskets” used here, for
Brabant (Van der Wee, 1975, 1978/1981) and Flanders (Munro, 1984a), both
modelled on the English index, are generally those paid by institutions, often
wholesale for bulk lots, and not retail prices paid by the typical artisan consumer
in the market place. Furthermore, these indexes are far more heavily weighted
with the prices of primary products than of finished goods. Thus, prices for
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farinaceous goods and drink are those of just their constituent grains (wheat, rye,
barley, peas), because, for this period, we simply lack adequate price series for
flour, bread, cereals, and beer. Indeed, in medieval England, local governments
regulated the sales of both bread and beer (ale), ostensibly fixed in price, by
quantity (size, weight, capacity), which officially was to vary inversely with the
price of their component grains.8 As Nef (1937) and more recently R. Allen
(2001) have noted, the price changes for bread, flour, and beer were undoubtedly
of a much lower amplitude than were those for grains, principally because labor
and marketing costs accounted for a much higher proportion of their prices than
for those of the raw grains. Consequently, price indexes heavily weighted with
grains – 42.50% in the Phelps Brown and Hopkins index – exaggerate the rise
of real wages during periods of falling grain prices, as in the deflationary fifteenth
century, and the fall of real wages during periods of rising grain prices, as in the
inflationary sixteenth century. But wage stickiness also meant that labor costs
accounted for a higher proportion of the total prices for these finished food
products during deflationary than inflationary periods.
Furthermore, one might reasonably object that these indexes are too heavily
weighted with foodstuffs, even if the other products – such as fish, meat, butter,
and cheese – are “finished’ consumer goods. As Table 1 indicates, foodstuffs
account for 80% of the component weights in the English and Flemish price
indexes, and for almost 75% in the Brabant index. But Phelps Brown and
Hopkins justified their index weights, especially for the fifteenth century base
period (1451–1475 = 100), with the expenditure records of a contemporary
Dorset household; and Van der Wee (1966) found similar records to justify his
weighting for foodstuffs, closely approximating the English index weights.9
If these price indexes are vastly preferable to the older ones based on grains
alone, one may yet complain that the range of commodities contained is still
too narrow. No allowance, for example, has been or can be made for rents and
related household costs. There are also other unfortunate omissions, because of
lacunae in the extant data. The Phelps Brown and Hopkins index, for example,
ceases to use prices for dairy products after 1430, so that thereafter meat and
fish prices (mutton and herrings) must carry the entire weight for that sub-index
(37.5%).10 While the Flemish and Brabant indexes do contain butter and cheese
prices throughout, the former lacks any prices for meat and fish, while the latter
lacks prices for wheat and peas; and in the Flemish index, the only industrial
prices are for woolen fabrics.11
Perhaps the chief criticism to be made is that, for the period of this study,
the fixed weights for the components in all three “baskets” do not properly
reflect the ability of most consumers to respond to changing relative prices by
making product substitutions. At the same time, the method of assigning such
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weights in the Brabant and Flemish “basket” differs significantly from that
chosen for the English “basket,” even though it served as the model for the
two Low Countries’ price indexes. For Phelps Brown and Hopkins constructed
their composite price index with fixed, unvarying expenditure shares: i.e. 42.5%
for grains; 37.5% for meat, fish, dairy products; and 20% for industrial products.
In that respect, their “basket” resembles a geometric index, though it was not
computed in this fashion. The actual quantities of the component commodities
that they specify in their article (1956/1981, p. 20) for the later-medieval and
early modern eras are in fact valid only for the base period 1451–1475. But
those specific commodities listed in the Phelps Brown and Hopkins “basket”
for this period provide an unvarying quantity base for the two Low Countries’
“baskets,” which are thus much more the standard Laspeyres-type price indexes.
The annual values of the basket are computed by multiplying the mean annual
prices (in pence groot of Brabant and of Flanders respectively) for each
commodity in the basket by that quantity; and the base 1451–1475 = 100 was
calculated by dividing the sum of those annual basket values by 25. The
expenditure shares for the various commodity groups in three baskets are
roughly comparable, as noted in Table 1, for this base period. But thereafter,
while the expenditure shares for each commodity group in the English “basket”
remained constant over time, those in the Brabant and Flemish “baskets”
changed with the rise or fall in the relative prices of the component commodities.
Thus, for example, as Table 8 indicates for the Flemish price indexes, grains
account for 55% of the total value of the “basket” during the Black Death era
(1348–1350) and again during the war-torn and plague-ridden period
1436–1440, but for only 37% during the peaceful, grain-abundant, and also
deflationary years 1496–1500. In that respect, the two Laspeyres baskets for
the Low Countries provide a better approximation of expected consumer
expenditures. As R. Allen (2001, pp. 423–425) has recently noted, however, no
alternative price indexes are likely to change the basic picture and resolve all
of these problems.12
II. PLAGUE, PRICES AND REAL-WAGES ACCORDING
TO THE DEMOGRAPHIC SCHOOL: 
THE POSTAN-ABEL MODEL
Avoiding these statistical price- and wage-index problems, most medieval
historians have instead found a far simpler and more compelling explanation
for the remarkably high level of real wages of later-medieval western Europe:
the impact of demographic catastrophes upon agrarian productivity. By far the
best known rendition of this view is to be found in the Ricardian-Malthusian
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models of Michael Postan (1950, 1951, 1952, 1966, 1972, 1973), Wilhelm Abel
(1978, 1980), and Georges Duby (1962/1968).13 Even the few opponents of
their model must now accept as an established fact the very drastic nature of
the late-medieval depopulations, especially in England, whose population fell
from a peak of at least 4.5 to 5.0 million in the 1290s (if not from 7.2 million,
as some have suggested) to about 2.5 or perhaps 3.0 million in 1377, finally
reaching a nadir of about 2.25 million in the early 1520s.14
Familiar though the Postan-Abel-Duby model may be, its key elements must be
briefly reiterated, if only to clarify the arguments that follow. The model’s basic
supposition is that the drastic decline in population during the fourteenth century,
especially after the Black Death and subsequent attacks of bubonic plague, and the
consequent alteration in the land-labor ratio, sharply increased the marginal
productivity of agrarian labor. In a fundamentally agrarian economy, such
changes presumably took place fairly quickly, with the abandonment of many
high-cost marginal lands that, with prior population growth, had been subject to
diminishing returns. Thus, arable husbandry would have become concentrated on
much better quality, higher-yielding lands that produced much more grain and
livestock products with proportionately much less labor.
At the same time, agricultural labor itself probably became even more scarce,
as former itinerant laborers took up deserted tenancies or sought better employ-
ment in the towns. Furthermore, this agrarian reorganisation served to increase
real-incomes even more by reducing the relative cost of cereal-grains and other
basic foodstuffs, and perhaps also housing costs, with so much more available
land. Artisans and laborers, finding that they were enjoying greater disposable
real incomes, after meeting the basic necessities of life, evidently chose to
increase their spending on meat, dairy products, industrial goods, and semi-
luxuries, thus driving up the relative prices of such goods. Prices for
manufactured goods should have risen even more, because the continued rise
in industrial wages would have accounted for an even greater share of total
production costs than did wages in producing grain and livestock products. Such
is the classic demographic model for the late-medieval English and indeed West
European economy, one that certainly seems both plausible and reasonable.
This emphasis upon the behavior of relative prices – i.e. a change in the
price of wheat relative to a change in the price of, say, linen cloth – is crucial
for any consideration of the Postan model in particular and of the analytical
discussion that follows. In Postan’s strongly pronounced views, these demo-
graphic changes were almost entirely responsible for late-medieval price
movements. Contending that the fall in prices was almost entirely confined to
grains, so that they diverged from other prices, many of which were rising,
indeed in accordance with the model, Postan (1972, p. 239) concluded that:
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monetary factors could not have been the sole or the main cause of the price changes, for
the pure logic of the monetary explanation demands that the effects of changes in the
circulating medium should be felt throughout the economy, i.e. in the prices of all the goods
bought and sold, since changes in money must be, so to speak, ‘neutral’ as between different
commodities.15
Such views about the behavior of late-medieval price-movement are, however,
quite misleading. First, as the accompanying Tables 5, 8, 9 and Figs 2–3 on
English, Flemish, and Brabantine prices indicate, the component price-indexes
for grains, livestock-products, and industrial goods generally tended to rise or
fall together, in distinct phases of inflation and deflation, though by no means
exactly in tandem, and with varying amplitudes and differing short-term
oscillations. Second, no respectable economist would ever contend that, while
monetary forces were at work in the economy, demographic and other “real”
forces would remain suspended or frozen, in time, i.e. without interacting
together, in altering the relative prices of many individual commodities.
Third, monetary changes are not “neutral” in the manner that Postan has
suggested. Suppose, for example, that a country’s supply of money had
increased. The regional distributions of such increased stocks would have
benefited some economic sectors more than others, thus allowing some groups
or socio-economic strata to gain relatively greater increases in money incomes.
The consequent changes in their savings and expenditure patterns, while possibly
producing changes in the income velocity of money, would also have altered
the prices of a wide variety of individual goods and services through their
impact on the price and income elasticities of demand for various commodities
and thus also on their elasticities of supply. Furthermore, if those changes in
money stocks (even with a possible reduction in the income velocity of money)
led to inflation, and if the money incomes of the lower strata of society did not
rise correspondingly, many would have been faced with severe budget
constraints, thus forcing them to spend proportionately more of their dispos-
able incomes on foodstuffs and necessities and less on other commodities. Such
demand shifts would likely have lowered the relative if not the nominal prices
of the latter (especially industrial goods).16
Suppose further, that this country – or, for the present analysis, most of
western Europe after the Black Death – experienced a rapid reduction in its
population without, initially, experiencing any corresponding reduction in its
aggregate money supply, and, not at least initially, in the income velocity of
money. The result would really have been the same: a relative increase in money
supplies, relative that is, to a much contracted economy, in which land, so much
of which was abandoned, and labor were the chief inputs. Consider this situation
in terms of the modernized version of the Fisher Identity: MV = Py, in which
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the variable y represents NNI (real net national income, in place of “T,” which
cannot be measured). Thus, if y fell to a greater extent than did any possible
reduction in the volume of money payments (i.e. the product of MV), then
obviously prices had to rise. The same conclusions are to be drawn in using
the much preferable Cambridge “cash balances’ approach: so that M = kPy
(and thus, k = 1/V). As will be seen later in this study, the Black Death was
indeed followed by rampant inflation throughout most of western Europe, for
about three decades.17
Postan, to his credit, certainly did understand the distinction between changes
in relative prices and shifts in the overall price-level. But he did not observe the
now readily available evidence for oscillating price-movements of general
inflation and deflation in late-medieval Europe (see Figs 1–3). Many of his
disciples, however, subsequently did become quite aware of these longer term
price-movements, yet they still incorrectly attributed those price movements
primarily to demographic changes. They evidently did so by confusing micro-
economics with macro-economics: i.e. by assuming that a perfectly valid
explanation for grain price-changes can be applied to the entire economy and its
overall price-level. A growth in population that encounters diminishing returns 
in agriculture will likely cause relative grain prices to rise; but, acting alone,
population growth cannot cause all or even most prices to rise. And conversely, a
fall in population, while it may well have led to a sharp fall in relative grain prices,
could not, by itself, have caused a general fall in prices – and certainly not
following the Black Death, when, as just noted, prices instead rose sharply.18
In short, demographic forces can influence long-term price movements
only by their interaction with other real economic forces, and by their conse-
quences in inducing changes in both money stocks and money flows,
including changes in credit. They may also have done so through their impact
in inducing or stimulating a growth in real net national output and national
income; and such was evidently the case during the “long” thirteenth century
(c. 1180 – c. 1320) and again during the sixteenth-century Price Revolution.
Ultimately, real economic growth – in turn promoting further population
growth and increased settlement and urbanization – might have reduced or
even eliminated elements of “slack” (elastic supplies) in the agricultural and
natural-resource (forestry, mining) sectors of the economy; and thus 
the economy might well have failed to sustain a rate of growth comparable
to that on the ongoing monetary expansion (in stocks and/or flows).
Consequently, under such circumstances, as Keynes himself observed, most
prices were bound to rise.19
For the wage question itself, there remains one further problem with the
Postan model, and indeed with the usual presentation of Classical Theory. For,
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in a frictionless market economy, without long-term wage contracts or other
institutional impediments, the real wage for any particular occupation or task,
defined by time and place, should be determined not just by the marginal product
but by the marginal revenue product of labor (MRP): i.e. the extra revenue that
the employer derives by selling the last unit of output produced by the last unit
of labor added to his fixed stock of land and capital. If, according to the Postan
model, the marginal productivity of agricultural labor rose, with the demo-
graphic, agrarian, and price shifts so posited for the late-medieval post-Plague
English economy, then presumably the marginal revenue from the sale of grain
and other arable products so produced on the now chiefly more productive lands
should have fallen, with falling prices (or falling relative grain prices). The
result, therefore, may have been just a “wash” in real wage changes. If, however,
contrary to the Postan model, relative grain prices did not consistently fall, then
real agricultural wages may well have risen in later-medieval England.
Though much evidence has been published that purports to show such a
continual rise in agricultural wages during the later fourteenth century (in decen-
nial means),20 the accounts of several Winchester manors do not consistently
validate that view. As Beveridge has noted (1936, p. 27), wages on most
Winchester manors, after beginning to rise from 1362–1363, were forced down
in 1367–1368, evidently at the behest of the new Bishop William of Wykeham;
but then the higher rates were restored between 1370 and 1375. The manorial
records of Taunton (Somerset) provide the most striking deviation from the
presumed norm in the behavior of laborers’ wages in later fourteenth-century
(Table 7). To be sure, with the onslaught of the Black Death, casual farm-
laborers on the Taunton manor had enjoyed a doubling in their money wage,
with a substantial increase as well in their real wage, from 1349 to 1356. But
thereafter their money and real wages both fell, and from 1362–1363 (i.e. before
the election of Bishop William) fell sharply to pre-Plague levels even in money
terms. Their real wages fell even more steeply below such levels, recovering
only from 1378; but their money wages did not recover before 1412–1413.21
Second, recently published research on fourteenth-century agricultural produc-
tion does not fully support the standard Malthusian-Ricardo-Postan model, which
purports to demonstrate that the marginal product of labor had to rise with
continued depopulation. To be sure, labor productivity did rise in pastoral farming
on many manors: proportionally fewer men were required to manage larger flocks
on an increased acreage. But, in several Winchester, Glastonbury, and Ramsey
Abbey manors, labor productivity generally fell on the arable, in the seven
decades from 1341 to 1421.22 Indeed, the Malthusian-Ricardian model fails to
demonstrate why any rise in industrial productivity should have occurred,
especially in the building and textile trades. In woolen-textile manufacturing,
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productivity in fact remained quite unchanged from the early fourteenth to the late
eighteenth centuries.23 Some medieval industries did benefit, to be sure, from
applications of more complex forms of water-powered machinery; but, in the
leading industries – textiles, mining, and metallurgy – most were instituted either
long before or a full century after the Black Death (except the blast smelter;
Reynolds, 1983; Holt, 1988; Munro, 2003a). For late-medieval industries in gen-
eral, convincing evidence is lacking to indicate that the forces of later-medieval
depopulation led to any positive qualitative changes in the composition, structure,
and institutional utilization of the surviving labor force.
Classical economic theory would suggest, however, that any rise in real wages
in the agrarian sector would necessarily be translated to the other sectors, lest
the latter lose labor to or from the agrarian sector (i.e. in reduced migration to
towns).24 But without real productivity increases, presumably the employment
of urban industrial labor would have been restricted to those crafts in which
WL = MRPL. Real urban industrial wages might have risen through a rise in
relative industrial prices, if that increased the employer’s marginal revenue; and
they would have risen further through any fall in the cost of living, chiefly in
foodstuffs. 
The first lesson to be learned in this study is that real-wage changes in the
late-medieval economy were very complex and confusing to the observer, then
and now. The other lesson, to be demonstrated later in this study, is not to
generalize about prices and real wages from the experience of late-medieval
England.
III. SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE DATA ON 
LONG-TERM WAGE STICKINESS
Are These Wage Data Truly Representative: Do “Sticky” Wages Really
Reflect Labor Markets?
Many historians, of course, have pointed out an even more serious problem:
the nature of the available wage data, which seem to be very unrepresentative.
For the medieval era, by far the most familiar wage data are those published
late in the last century by James E. Thorold Rogers (1866, 1882) and made
even more accessible in the famous wage and price indexes of Henry Phelps
Brown and Sheila Hopkins (which also includes other sources, from
Buckinghamshire, Hampshire, Sussex and Kent). They themselves expressed a
few reservations about the validity of these data in truly depicting long-term,
downward wage stickiness (1955, 1981, pp. 7–8):
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Certainly our method of taking a representative rate is biased towards stability . . . since for
most of our period these payments were made not by employers to wage-earners but by
customers to craftsmen working on their own account, and these customers were generally
institutions and not private persons who had to put their hands into their own pockets. But
after due allowance for these things, the absence of sustained falls and of falling trends
remains remarkable. It has been called the elbow-joint or ratchet effect.
Unconvinced by this argument, Lindert (1985, p. 618) accused them of delib-
erately seeking wage rates that could be regarded as “representative because
they were recurrent,” and then of constructing their wage series “in such a way
as to overstate wage stickiness.” Nevertheless, while pleading for historians to
produce “other long-term wage series to ease the strain of over-reliance on the
classic Phelps Brown-Hopkins series,” Lindert himself necessarily still used
them, as have Wrigley and Schofield (1981, 1989), and many other historians.
In medieval economic history, however, beggars seeking statistical data
cannot be choosers; and neither Thorold Rogers nor Phelps Brown and Hopkins
had much choice. Nor have other historians in subsequent publications. For the
only readily available and suitable data are those provided by institutions willing
to record them over long periods of time: medieval manors, town governments,
hospitals, universities and colleges, guild houses, etc. Apart from the manorial
and abbey accounts, which certainly do include some agricultural occupations
(not considered in this study), most of the available institutional records provide
wage data that are limited to building craftsmen, including carpenters, masons,
tilers, plasterers, but also thatchers and street-pavers. By no coincidence, these
are the very occupations whose wages were ostensibly regulated by the famous
Ordinance (June 1349) and Statute of Labourers (1350–1351), and by most other
late-medieval English wage legislation (except the 1388 Statute of Cambridge).25
Such wages, it must be noted are time-based, initially by the week and then
more frequently by the day. In the later-medieval and early-modern European
economies, however, the great majority of laborers and craftsmen, and most
especially those in agriculture, textiles, leather-goods, metal wares, etc., received
instead piece-work wages, which, when available, are often difficult to interpret,
since we usually cannot measure output per day.26
In their presentation of daily-wage data, Phelps Brown and Hopkins (1955)
differed significantly from not only the older studies on wages, by Thorold
Rogers (1866, 1882) and Steffen (1901–1905), but also from those published
since by several other historians: in particular, Beveridge (1936–1937,
1955–1956), Knoop and Jones (1933, 1967), Schreiner (1954), and Farmer
(1983, 1988, 1991). Together, those studies may convince many readers that
medieval wage stickiness was just a myth. For their tables, whether annual or
decennial, reveal almost continuous oscillations in wage-rates, sometimes small
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but often significant. Seemingly inexplicable, these oscillations disappear when
one reads the original sources (manorial and town records) and then realizes
that these historians have computed their annual data and decennial means by
taking averages of the wage payments or wage rates in each record, thus
producing “compositional errors.”
Consider, as an example, a building project or manorial repairs employing a
dozen carpenters in the year: with three senior master carpenters earning 4.5
and 5.0d per day, seven ordinary master carpenters earning 4.0d per day and
two junior, less experienced master carpenters earning 3.5d per day.27 Their
mean wage would then be 4.250d unweighted and 4.083d weighted. If, in the
following year, only ten carpenters were employed, with only one senior
carpenter, earning 5.0d per day, six earning the standard 4.0d per day, and three
earning 3.5d per day, the unweighted mean would now be 4.167d and the
weighted mean, 3.950d. An examination of these accounts year after year would
reveal that, for each class or status of master carpenters, the wage rates were
in fact unchanging – and thus very sticky. Phelps Brown and Hopkins, to their
great credit, selected for each year what appeared to be the standard or
representative wage, which, admittedly, becomes a more difficult task during
periods of transitional wages.
Further proof that the Thorold Rogers’ and Phelps Brown and Hopkins’
published wage data are indeed representative of the contemporary labor markets
may be found in the wage-payment records for craftsmen in such medium-sized
towns as Canterbury, Exeter, Dover, Winchester, and York.28 Certainly, during
the later fourteenth and the fifteenth centuries, their wage rates did not
significantly differ from those that Thorold Rogers (1866, 1882) found in the
Oxford and Cambridge records, with generally the same degrees of long-term
wage stickiness, if not for as long a period as for the Oxford craftsmen. Together
all these town wage-data for master building craftsmen were or came to be about
midway between those for master building craftsmen recorded, at the lower end,
in the accounts of the Bishop of Winchester’s estates, of the Bishop of Bury St.
Edmunds (Redgrave), and of Battle Abbey, and, at the upper end, the wages
recorded for London artisans. Thus, during the second half of the fourteenth
century, the standard wage for master craftsmen on the Battle Abbey and
Winchester rural estates was 4d per day. At Oxford and Cambridge, as noted
earlier, the wages for such craftsmen had risen from 5d to 6d per day about 1363,
while the wages for such building craftsmen in the other medium-sized towns
listed above generally remained at 5d per day until about 1410–1415 (then
increased as well to 6d), just before the wage rates for most London building
craftsmen had risen from 7.0d or 7.5d to 8.0d per day. About that same time, the
manorial wage rates for these building craftsmen also rose, from 4d to 5d per day.
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Was Medieval Wage Stickiness Confined to Long-term, Contractual
Institutional Employment?
The best answer to this question, and one that further reinforces the previous
answer on the representative nature of such wage data, can be derived from a
comparison of wage payments in various London records, in particular those
of: the Tower Bridge Authority (London Bridge Master); the various London
guilds (Brewers, Cutlers, Carpenters, Grocers, Ironmongers); Westminster
Abbey and its manors; and, finally, the Bishop of Winchester’s London manor
of Southwark. The Bridge Masters, in maintaining their various buildings 
and residential tenements, employed many craftsmen who appear to have been
virtually “tenured,” i.e. continuously employed for many years or decades; but
the other three employers generally hired their masons, carpenters and other
such craftsmen only on a purely occasional basis, generally for just a few days
at a time, on what appears to be virtually a “spot market” for labor. For almost
all such building craftsmen, in those fifteenth-century years for which a quadri-
partite comparison is possible, the wage data are virtually identical, and thus
indicate that all four London-based institutions were compelled to pay the same
market wages, for both short and long-term employment.29 It is equally
instructive to note that during the early fifteenth century, master carpenters and
masons employed on the Southwark manor, across the Thames from the heart
of the old City of London (and near the various guild halls), were earning
exactly the same daily wage (8d) as were those hired by the nearby guild halls
and the London Tower Bridge Authority, and thus from 60% to 100% more
than those employed in the Bishop of Winchester’s rural manors in southern
England.30 Such evidence therefore also does not support the commonly
expressed view that daily wage rates were higher for casual short-term employ-
ment than for guaranteed annual employment. It also casts doubt on the view
that late-medieval laborers, agricultural workers, and craftsmen came to prefer
both the greater individual freedom and higher (real) rates for the former type
of discontinuous employment.31
For the Low Countries, similar institutional sources, but most especially town
government accounts – for Bruges, Ghent, Ypres, Mechelen, Leuven, Antwerp,
Aalst (Alost) – and some urban-based abbeys, churches, and hospitals provide
even more voluminous daily-wage data to support all of these conclusions: for
the very same sets of building craftsmen, and also for some textile artisans and
even policemen (in Bruges).32 The wage data for such craftsmen and policemen
throughout the late-medieval Low Countries exhibit patterns very similar to
those of the English artisans, as suggested earlier, most especially during periods
of stable coinage, even though their governments were sensible enough never
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to impose wage ordinances, certainly none as restrictive as the Statute of
Labourers. In most, if not in all cases, the craftsmen receiving such wages were
similarly not long-term privileged employees, but those working for short
periods – often just a few days or weeks – for many and various employers.
In the woolen draperies of the late-medieval Low Countries, their predominant
manufacturing industry, daily wages are available only for the fullers, since
most other textile workers received piece-work wages or fees (the latter, for
shearers and dyers). Most fullers similarly worked for not one but a variety 
of different master-weaver drapers, for short and discrete periods of time. 
They were free to change their employers – and they were also capable of
going on strike to achieve their collective guild-wage demands, if not always
successfully.33
Was Late-medieval Wage Stickiness the Consequence of State Intervention?
Many historians, especially British economic historians, believe that, in so far
as we may discern such wage stickiness, it was both the consequence of the
“wage freeze” imposed by the infamous Ordinance (1349) and Statute of
Labourers (1351) and/or an artifice to evade it: i.e. payment records to simu-
late compliance, when employers were in reality paying more than the recorded
amounts.34 The short answer in response to such charges is that the patterns of
long-term wage stickiness were virtually identical in late-medieval England and
the Low Countries. In England itself, furthermore, such wage stickiness, 
and most especially downward wage stickiness, continued to be the prevalent
feature for the employment of day laborers and artisans for centuries after such
legislation – from the Ordinance of Labourers to the 1563 Statute of Artificers
– had become dead letters (Table 2).35
Such answers will, nevertheless, not satisfy those historians who believe that
the late-medieval records of wage-payments reflect, in some fashion, compliance
with these Statutes, all the more so since Putnam (1908), Ritchie (1934), Penn
and Dyer (1990), and Hatcher (1994) have all provided convincing evidence
that the crown and local authorities did seek to enforce these statutes, at least
until the late 1380s. Their arguments and evidence, especially Hatcher’s, must
be taken very seriously, even if such evidence does not really extend beyond
the late fourteenth century. Yet the observer may just as strongly question the
longer-term success of such enforcement of wage-rate ceilings by examining
more closely the manorial wage records – and thereby acquire greater confidence
in their validity.
For virtually all of these manorial accounts demonstrate that most of the
recorded wages were substantially above those permitted by the 1349 Ordinance
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and the 1351 Statute of Labourers (Table 2); and a fair number of these accounts
indicate that some senior, or more highly skilled, craftsmen earned daily wages
that were from 25% to 50% in excess of those permitted by statute.36 Evidently
those who maintained these accounts (bailiffs and stewards) had not entertained
any fears of prosecution in recording such wages; and it would be difficult to
prove that those few who did record wages within the statutory limits did so
because of such fears. Possibly the lower wages on the smaller number of
“compliant” manors are to be explained by a higher proportion of labor supplied
by still customary (servile) tenants and by more isolated rural labor markets
(such as at Taunton, in Somerset).
Certainly the later-medieval English towns, with presumably higher living
costs, readily permitted wages above those prescribed in the Ordinance and
Statute of Labourers, even though these royal writs in no way exempted the
towns or tolerated higher rates (Table 2). In blatantly ignoring the 1349
Ordinance, London’s civic government issued its wage ordinance the following
year (1350) to fix the maximum wage for building craftsmen at 6d per summer
and 5d per winter day, i.e. from Easter to Michaelmas (29 September), to Easter.
Both were one pence higher than the maximum wages permitted in the previous
London ordinance of 1290, but double that permitted in the 1349 royal
Ordinance and the 1351 national statute.37 Not until 1495 did Parliament
recognize London’s special status within the kingdom, and its much higher cost
of living, with legislation to authorize these very same rates of 6d and 5d per
day, respectively (but only 4d daily with food and drink), with some minor
exceptions (Table 2).38 In any event, long before then, and certainly by the
1370s, most employers of building craftsmen in London were ignoring not only
the Statute of Labourers but also the local civic ordinances on maximum wages,
as the evidence just cited clearly shows.39 Nevertheless the impact of such labor
legislation cannot be fully ignored in that it may have served to restrict the full
impact of those forces driving up wages, and in particular may have led to 
the elimination of some seasonal wages, to be discussed in the answer to the
following question.
Does Institutional Wage Stickiness Reflect Adjustments in the Real Wage by
Other Means: By Adjusting Hours of Work and Thus by Substituting More
Leisure for Paid Employment?
Since medieval and early-modern employers, not only in England, but
throughout Europe, paid those employees receiving time-work wages commonly
by the week and then more commonly by the day, though not by the hour,
employers and employees might have bargained to adjust real wages, according
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to changing economic circumstances, by altering the length of the work-week
or day. Some historians have suggested that, in pre-Industrial societies
especially, many artisans, craftsmen, and laborers had a “backward bending
supply curve of labor.” Thus, such workers, on finding that their real wages
had risen to permit them to acquire some desired level of sustenance and
comfort, would have preferred to enjoy increased leisure time over further
increases in money income; and thus they would have chosen to work less, or
to refuse to work for traditionally long hours. Hatcher (1994, pp. 13–19) has
suggested that such a substitution of leisure for paid work may have been a
component of rising real wages after the Black Death.
Indeed, several years earlier, Blanchard (1978) had provided some evidence
for such a “backward bending” supply curve for labor in the late-medieval
English mining industry, many of whose rural workers were seasonal, primarily
engaging in the agrarian economy. Obviously such circumstances would vary
by time, region, and occupation. Yet there is no convincing evidence that such
a backward-bending supply curve for labor was a significant feature of employ-
ment in the late medieval economy, certainly not in the building and textile
trades. Some research done on this very question may be found in a recent
publication on seasonal wages and leisure in late-medieval England and the
Low Countries (Munro, 1994d). For neither region was there any convincing
evidence that urban craftsmen sought to increase their leisure time, even after
real wages had peaked in the mid-fifteenth century, by reducing either the work
day or the work week, which was usually six full days.
There are, of course, only scant, sporadic data on the actual number of days
worked per year, except for the invaluable data that Herman Van der Wee
(1963) has provided on employment in the building trades in the Antwerp-Lier
region, for each and every year from 1436 to 1600. For the base period employed
in this study, 1451 to 1475, the mean number of days so worked was 210 days,
precisely the same average in the late sixteenth century. The fewest number so
worked, 191 days, occurred during the civil war era (towns vs. Maximilian)
from 1483 to 1492 (91.01% of this mean); the highest number, 260 days
(124.0% of the mean), during the 1540s and early 1550s. If the scope of these
data is restricted to the first full century, 1436–1535, we find absolutely no
correlation between real wages and the number of days worked.40
Some idea of the length of the normal working day, in this era, may be
gleaned from data on seasonal wages. For in medieval and early-modern Europe,
such wages were paid in accordance with the basic principle that “man works
from sun to sun.” Indeed the stipulation that both men and women were required
to work at least twelve hours during summer months can be found in the 1495
parliamentary statute on maximum wages. From mid-March to mid-September
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all English “artificers and laborers” were to work from 5:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m.,
with 30 minutes for breakfast, 30 minutes for nonemete (or sleep) and one hour
for dinner; and in the other half of the year, they were to work from sunrise
to nightfall.41 Certainly that customary working day and week, if not the law,
prevailed in Great Britain, until the enactment of Fielden’s Law or the Ten-
Hour Day Act in 1847.42 In the Low Countries, numerous fifteenth-century guild
records affirm that the normal paid working day was then identical to the
English, with a full six-day working week.43 Far more so than in England,
furthermore, the wage data for this region reveal a clear distinction between
summer and winter wages (November to March); and, since the number of
hours of daylight during winter months at this latitude (50° N) is about eight
hours, the winter wage was generally from two-thirds to three-quarters the
summer wage, despite the much higher cost of living during these cold, dark
months.
In London, and some other English towns, however, seasonal wages generally
disappeared after the Black Death.44 Quite possibly the payment of a uniform
wage rate, i.e. a winter wage equal to the summer wage, came to be an
acceptable method of circumventing the Statute of Labourers’ wage controls,
since the Statute and its enforcement really focused only on the summer
maxima.45 Possibly the combination of the consequently higher wage throughout
the entire year may have permitted some such substitution of greater leisure,
at least in the summer months, for paid work. In the mid-fifteenth century,
however, the London Bridgemaster did introduce a slight differential in seasonal
payments (1441), and one that effectively raised the annual wage.46 In the Low
Countries, south and north, where seasonal wages prevailed up to the French
Revolution, Bruges was exceptional in generally having a uniform wage rate
throughout the year, but only until the 1430s. Thereafter, rather surprisingly,
lower winter wages were introduced into the building trades, while summer
wages were raised.47
Does Institutional Wage Stickiness Reflect Adjustments in the Real Wage by
Other Means: By Adjusting the Proportion of the Total Wage Package Made
“In Kind’?
According to very commonly held views about medieval and early modern
wages, most artisans and laborers supposedly received a significant portion of
their total wage package “in kind’ or “in truck,” so that employers adjusted the
real wage by altering the amount paid in the form of food, drink, and clothing
amounts. Thus, according to this same view, nominal money-wage stickiness
is illusory and/or irrelevant. That some medieval wages were indeed paid partly
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in kind, especially in the agrarian sector, is incontestable. Most wage-payment
records, including all the English statutes, are perfectly clear, however, in
indicating whether the wage was in coined money alone, or “with food’ (or
other benefits); and for the latter, the money wage was always proportionally
less.48 Most economic historians in publishing wage data have been equally
clear in specifying that the payments were in money alone.
In manorial accounts, especially the Winchester accounts, for later medieval
England, wage payments in kind were quite common up to the eve of the Black
Death, often accounting for 50% of the total wage package; but after the 
Black Death the component in food and drink fell to a third or less of the total
pay package and they became less common in the following generations, except
principally at Battle Abbey. The Battle Abbey manorial accounts generally
provide two series of wage payments for the same classes of craftsmen and
agricultural workers: those paid in both money and kind, and those paid in
coined money alone. The sum of the former seems to equal the latter; and the
rates for those paid in money alone at Battle Abbey were identical or virtually
identical to those for unspecified but presumably “money-alone” wage payments
on other manors.49 One may surmise that when the price of foodstuffs fell
sharply in the late fourteenth century (see Table 5), laborers and artisans would
have resisted having any substantial portion of their pay package supplied in
kind.
There are very few available urban wage data before the Black Death; but
the various accounts for later-medieval London and other smaller English towns
(Canterbury, Dover, Exeter), do not indicate any significant evidence of
payments in kind, other than some allotments of clothing (chiefly for a few
master-masons and carpenters in long-term employ at Westminster Abbey).50
For these reasons, one may conclude that wage payments in kind did not
appreciably alter the picture of real wages constructed by using money payments
alone, at least not for the later Middle Ages, even if such views are not endorsed
in Hatcher’s recent and otherwise persuasive article (1994) discussed above.
Across the Channel, in the towns of later-medieval Flanders and Brabant, the
town accounts provide virtually no evidence of any significant wage payments
made in kind; and, for the rare instances in which they do occur in the records
as a drincgeld, they account for no more than 1% of the wage packet, and seem
to be for special workers hired outside the town.51 In fifteenth-century Leiden,
the fullers’ guild ordinances (keuren), authorized by the town government
(gerecht), are quite explicit in forbidding any payments in “truck” (kind),
stipulating that payments be made each Saturday in silver coin alone. A remnant
of some former partial payment in drink evidently continued in sporadic,
occasional payments of drincgeld; but this too was paid in silver coin (a stuiver,
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worth 2d groot).52 Similarly, in their analyses of medieval Flemish and
Brabantine wages, Verlinden and Scholliers (1959–1965) and Van der Wee
(1963) found little evidence of payments in kind; and thus they also provided
data only on money wages.
Nevertheless, the Flemish and Brabantine town accounts, which generally
provide the full names and occupations of the craftsmen so paid, do provide
evidence that many master masons, carpenters, slate-tilers, and street-pavers
were also industrial entrepreneurs who made substantially more money than
their daily wages by selling their supplies – bricks, stones, sand, lumber, nails,
wire, etc. – to the city government.53 Indeed, some masters were also drapers,
cloth merchants, brewers, or minor civic officials, many of whom so prospered
in these roles that they ultimately relinquished their original status as daily-
wage earners. Nevertheless many other minor masters and virtually all
journeymen (knapen) and other assistants did not seem to earn any such extra
incomes, though some of them may have had their own small agricultural
holdings, either within or just outside the town walls. Those circumstances
obviously make a complete and proper estimate of real incomes difficult. As
Van Zanden (1999, p. 178) has recently contended:
This [artisan’s household] budget is made up of different sources of income, of which wage
income is only one. But we assume it was an important source (and not a marginal one)
for the European working classes of the early modern period. Moreover, the wage rate is
exogenous for the household: it cannot influence its level in the short or the long run. This
means that a rationally acting household will adapt its strategy to this given wage-level.
IV. THE KEYNESIAN INFLEXIBLE-WAGE MODEL
AND THE NATURE OF MEDIEVAL LABOR
CONTRACTS
Even if these recorded nominal money-wage data reflect market conditions, and
are not institutional artifices, such wages would, however, clearly not be
determined in the short-run by the Classical equation: i.e. that WL = MRPL –
not then and just as certainly not now. As most contemporary macro-economists
would agree, if only because of its obvious truth, “nominal wage rates are not
determined on a daily basis according to the law of supply and demand . . .
even though it is the real wage that determines the demand for and supply of
labor;” but not necessarily all of them would find the full solution in “the
modern interpretation of the Keynesian inflexible-wage model [which] focuses
on the role played by labor contracts,” explicit or implicit.54
My own current research in the late-medieval era has revealed only one form
of explicit long-term wage-contracts produced by formal and arbitrated collec-
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tive bargaining between a guild and an association of entrepreneurial employers:
those for the aforementioned fullers of Flanders, Brabant, and Holland, whose
analyses require a completely separate article (Munro, 2002). As Knoop and
Jones (1933, 1936, 1962, 1967), more recently Swanson (1988, 1989) and Blair
and Ramsay (1991) have shown, from extensive investigations, medieval
English building craftsmen did not enjoy any similar form of guild protection
that would have permitted collective bargaining and labor contracts.
Nevertheless Knoop and Jones have also demonstrated that for major building
projects in later medieval England, France, and Italy, the chief master mason,
acting more as a contractor-entrepreneur than as an artisan, often required or
obtained written contracts that clearly specified not only the costs of building
materials but also the rates of pay for his workers for the duration of the project.
Sometimes, however, the contract was in the form of an opus ad tascam whose
specified sum amounted to pay for piece-work accomplished, rather than daily
rates. Some other older master masons rose in status to become wardens or
foremen for large building projects, in the service of a secular or ecclesiastical
lord, receiving a contract for many years, or even a lifetime, specifying an
annual salary, with clothing and other material benefits.
Many other labor contracts may have been unwritten, i.e. the “implicit
contracts” (by “invisible hand-shakes,” etc.) about which modern macro- and
labor-economists and some economic historians have published so extensively.
Their analyses, however, cannot be readily applied to the often intractable
medieval sources on artisans.55 We may at least surmise that the long-term
and virtually permanent artisan-employees of the London Tower Bridge
Authority probably did enjoy at least the privileges of an implicit contract.
But, it seems hardly credible that short-term, part-time, itinerant craftsmen,
working for a variety of employers (while frequently mixing occupations),
for discrete but indeterminate periods, would have benefited from any such
form of implicit contracts, even if their wage patterns demonstrated the same
degree of wage stickiness. In any event, fully enforceable written contracts
would have succeeded, at the most, in fixing wages for only a few years at
a time – or for medieval building projects, for their duration. Thus, they can
hardly explain these many examples of very long-term wage stickiness lasting
for over half-a-century, or as much as 174 years, in that singular Oxford
example just cited.
Nevertheless, in the absence of good data and established theory, one may
still offer credible (rather than merely plausible) hypotheses to explain at
least some forms of wage stickiness. During periods of inflation, most
employers were reluctant to award nominal wage increases that matched
rising consumer prices and living costs, especially if the prices of their own
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products were not rising as steeply as were food prices. Despite the emphasis
to be given to deflationary periods in this analysis, certainly continental
western Europe, during the Hundred Years War era especially (1337–1453),
experienced frequent, if short term, inflations from periodic war-induced
coinage debasements. With so many jagged oscillations in prices, we, as
modern computer-assisted observers, are better able to detect those trends
than were medieval employers.
If periods of late-medieval inflation were relatively brief in duration – in
contrast to the sixteenth-century Price Revolution era, most employers would
probably have not encountered any strong pressures to raise money wages,
despite the short-term decline in real wages. As Keynes noted (1936, pp. 12–13),
in citing one of his chief objections to one of the prime “postulates” of Classical
theory: “A fall in real wages due to a rise in prices, with money-wages unaltered,
does not, as a rule cause the supply of labor available on offer at the current
[money] wage to fall below the amount actually employed prior to the rise of
prices.” Indeed modern macro-economic models convincingly demonstrate that
under such inflationary conditions wage stickiness “results in an increase in
employment and output,” and usually, though not necessarily, in employer
profits (Wilton & Prescott, 1987, pp. 216–217).
Conversely, during periods of deflation, most wage-earning employees,
whether or not they were truly suffering from a “money-illusion,” were and
still are extremely hostile to any attempts to reduce their nominal wages,
even if, with some inevitable wage reductions, they still ended up better off
in real terms. Workers surely had and still do have some legitimate concern
that wage rates and other benefits once cut will not readily be restored,
without some considerable struggle, once market conditions improve and
prices begin to rise again. As Keynes also cogently remarked (1936, p. 15):
“Every trade union will put up some resistance to a cut in money-wages,
however small.”56
In late-medieval Flanders and Holland, that is precisely what the fullers 
did, in the form of organized strikes (uutgangen), when faced with wage
reductions during periods of monetary reform and deflation.57 If other late-
medieval wage-earning craftsmen, in both England and the Low Countries,
did not enjoy similarly strong guild protection, undoubtedly many, with or
without less formal organizations, were still able to convey their opposition
with sufficient conviction or hostility to prevent any nominal-wage reduc-
tions. Obviously those unprotected, such as itinerant or part-time agricultural
laborers, were much more likely to suffer nominal-wage cuts during periods
of deflation, as seems to have been the case in both late-medieval England
and Flanders (see below, pp. 226–227).
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V. MONEY, PRICES, AND WAGES BEFORE THE
BLACK DEATH: ENGLAND, 1280–1348
Far more so than any other region in late-medieval Europe, England and the
Low Countries (the latter from at least the 1350s) both offer an abundant amount
of price and wage data, in virtually unbroken annual series, to investigate the
nature of long-term wage-stickiness, and in particular its most interesting aspect:
namely, downward wage-stickiness during periods of deflation, and thus what
Phelps Brown and Hopkins called the “rachet effect” (see p. 196 above). But
not until the later fourteenth century does the evidence support the view that
wages exhibited a greater degree of rigidity or “stickiness” during deflations
than during intervening periods of inflation.
Therefore, the proper place to commence this aspect of study on historical
real wages is in a previous era of deflation, which took place during the second
quarter of the fourteenth century (at least, in England). That deflation had
followed the era of the Great Famine (1315–1322), which had marked the culmi-
nation of the long, generally sustained inflation of the so-called “long thirteenth
century.” For Postan and many other historians, the end of this era also marked
the onset of an incipient Malthusian crisis of “overpopulation,” deteriorating
living conditions for the lower strata of society, and indeed malnutrition and
higher mortalities, even before the onslaught of the Great Famine.58 It must be
noted, however, that the wage and price data compiled by Thorold Rogers
(1866, 1882) and Phelps Brown and Hopkins (1955, 1956, 1981) do not indicate
any deterioration in the real wages of manorial building craftsmen before the
Great Famine; and such evidence shows indeed that nominal wages were rising,
and keeping pace with prices until that calamity struck (Tables 5–6).
Thereafter, in the decades following the Great Famine, we witness one of
the most striking and puzzling phenomena in all of England’s recorded monetary
and price history: a severe, indeed dazzling, plunge in English mint outputs,
still entirely in silver; and, following that, an almost equally drastic deflation,
reflected in the 35% fall in the Phelps Brown-Hopkins price index, from 138
in 1321–1325 to just 90 in 1341–1345, on the eve of the Black Death (Fig. 1;
Tables 3–5).
Postan, of course, evidently wanted to attribute the fall in at least the grain-
price index to the demographic consequences of the Great Famine, or rather to
a more general Malthusian crisis of overpopulation in a relatively primitive
agrarian economy: “when the poorer lands, no longer new, punished the men
who tilled them with failing crops and with murrain,” so much so as “to send
the population figures tumbling down.”59 Lawrence Poos has recently provided
evidence to indicate significant population decline in rural Essex after the Great
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Famine and on into the post-Plague era.60 For Europe more generally one can
cite evidence for regional depopulations in early-fourteenth century Provence
and Tuscany, though evidently related to the horrendous warfare then afflicting
these regions.61 Campbell (1983a, 1983b, 1984), however, has provided equally
compelling evidence of continued population growth in post-Famine Norfolk,
while also demonstrating that late-medieval English agriculture was far less
primitive and far less prone to Malthusian pressures than Postan had suggested.
Smith (1991) has provided a masterful survey of demographic developments in
rural England, from 1300 to 1348, which, while inconclusive, documents
complex regional variations in demographic decline, with continued if slow
growth, or stagnation; and thus it does not lend any support to Postan’s drastic
views.62 Nor does the recorded fall in nominal wages, from 1337–1338 (see
below, p. 209) logically support a depopulation hypothesis. Furthermore, the
decline in prices was general, and not limited to just grains (see Table 5).
Some Monetary Causes of Deflation
This prolonged fall in prices was instead genuine deflation, for which monetary
reasons must be sought. The true explanation for an evidently stark monetary
contraction and consequent deflation, apparent also from the Tuscan price data,63
remains a mystery that cannot satisfactorily be resolved. Possibly it was due to
a relative scarcity of precious metals, if, as several historians have asserted, the
major German and Central European silver mines had begun to experience not
just diminishing returns but serious physical depletion by the early fourteenth
century, while the European economy continued to grow, and with it, the
aggregate demand for coined money.64 Indeed, as Mayhew (1974) has also
demonstrated, contrary to another of Postan’s assertions, coined money is
perishable to some considerable degree: from wear, tear, and normal loss in
circulation, from shipwrecks, unrecovered hoards, conversion into jewellery and
plate, etc., so that the money supply will indeed contract if not continually
replenished with fresh minting.65 For England itself, some historians have also
suggested that the crown’s foreign military expenditures (under both Edward
II and Edward III) had led to major outflows of bullion, though the fall in mint-
outputs and the onset of deflation seems to precede the evidence for any such
drastic bullion outflows.66 Finally, since England in this era was minting only
silver, and no gold before January 1344 (none since 1257), the very dramatic
rise in the bimetallic ratio, from about 12.0 : 1 in the 1290s to 14.2 : 1 in the
mid-1320s may have instigated a large outflow of silver coinage to acquire the
higher valued gold. Indeed, such bullion movements may have been necessary
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to permit England’s inauguration of an effective gold coinage in the period
1344–1352, though with a then falling bimetallic ratio.67
Some very general indication of possible bullion outflows from England and
a relative scarcity of specie during the second quarter of the fourteenth century
may be found in the coinage-output statistics (Tables 3–4). The mean annual
values of those outputs (all in silver) fell from a peak of £125,836 sterling in
1306–1310 to a nadir of £381 in 1326–1330; recovering to a mean of only
£7,091 in 1346–1350, at the outbreak of the Black Death.
Such mint-accounts provide, however, only a very general and very tenuous
guide to current monetary conditions. They can be of some value in that years
with very low mint outputs were generally followed by prolonged deflation
(marked as well by complaints about the scarcity of specie); and, conversely,
years of very high mint outputs generally coincide with eras of sustained 
inflation. But extrapolating a nation’s current money supply from these accounts
is an enterprise fraught with great dangers, for many complex reasons, the most
important of which is that mint-accounts combine stocks and flows in
unpredictable and unquantifiable fashions.68 Nevertheless, some brave historians
believe that a 30-year running average of such outputs may provide an
acceptably reliable indication of the coined money stock. Recently, two
economic historians have used a combination of mint accounts and coin hoards
to show that the English money supply probably contracted by over one half
in this era.69
What is especially striking and peculiar about this deflation, though affording
further evidence that it was a genuine deflation (Tables 4–5), was the marked
decline in nominal wages shown in Table 6. From about 1337 to 1340, the
mean money wage of a master building craftsmen in southern England fell from
4d per day to 3d per day, a decline of 25%; and that very low mean wage-rate
was maintained until early 1351, i.e. several years after the Black Death (Fig.
4).70 As Phelps Brown and Hopkins have indicated (1955/1981, pp. 11–12), the
only other period in recorded English price-history with any such decline in
the nominal wages of building craftsmen, came almost six-centuries later: the
post-World War I slump of 1920–1923 (31.3% decline) and the early depres-
sion years of 1929–1934 (8.3% decline). In the earlier part of this
early-fourteenth century period, before this fall in nominal wages, i.e. with
continued nominal wage rigidity,71 real wages did rise, though the brief rise
appears to be dramatic only because of the recovery from the drastic nadir of
the Great Famine years. When the real-wage of those master craftsmen peaked
in 1334–1335, it was not appreciably higher than in the very early years of the
century (1303–1307). Then their real wages suffered a sharp fall, as also shown
in Table 6; indeed they fell quite steeply before the Black Death, with the initial
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recovery of the price level from 1344, and especially with the inflation that
soared immediately after the Black Death, one that endured for a full generation.
VI. ENGLAND FOLLOWING THE BLACK DEATH
(1348): MONEY, WAGES, AND THE STATUTE OF
LABOURERS
That is why the Ordinance (1349) and Statute of Labourers (1350–1351) were
so very unreasonable and cruel, but also so difficult to enforce: in attempting
to fix money-wages at the pre-Plague level, when both money and real wages
had been so unusually low (Tables 2, 5, 6).72 Thus, specifically forbidding
anyone to offer or accept any wages higher than those prevailing in 1346, the
Statute of Labourers set the maximum summer wages (Easter to Michaelmas)
for master masons, carpenters, and tilers, “without meat or drink,” at 3d per
day; for their servants and laborers, at 1.5d a day; but it also permitted a rate
of 4d per day for master free-masons.73 This harsh statute remained in force
(reconfirmed numerous times), ostensibly on a national basis, until the
parliament of 1444–1445, which finally raised the maximum daily rate for such
craftsmen to 5.5d for summer and 4.5d for the winter season, without food and
drink (or: 4d and 3d, respectively, with food and drink).74 As noted earlier in
this study, London had independently, in 1350, established its own maximum
wage of 6d per summer and 5d per winter day for these same craftsmen (Table
2);75 and such rates were already in force at Westminster Abbey, for master
building craftsmen in 1349.76
Thereafter, but not immediately after the Black Death, money wages did rise,
certainly for these urban-based craftsmen.77 At Oxford, where most building
craftsmen had not suffered the nominal wage cuts in the 1330s, the prevailing
daily wage rate rose from 4d to 5d during the 1350s; in other small-sized towns
the rate rose from 3d to 5d by the end of the decade. Not until 1363, as noted
earlier (p. 187), did Oxford masons and carpenters gain the daily rate of 6d, at
least for summer work, that London had authorized in 1350; and not until about
1407–1409 did the mean daily rate for craftsmen in the other smaller towns
achieve the same 6d level, i.e. the mean rate for the Phelps Brown and Hopkins
index, unchanged until 1536.78
In many, indeed evidently most, of the Winchester manors and at Battle
Abbey, the daily wage for such building craftsmen, while soon rising back to
the 4d level that had prevailed from about 1310 to 1337, remained fixed at that
truly low level – even if 25% above that stipulated by the Statute of Laborers,
with some occasional exceptions for senior craftsmen at 5d daily, until about
c.1410–c.1425. 79 Such evidence may lend support to the oft-cited contention
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of Holmes (1975, p. 115), with some support from Britnell (1990), that by the
eve of the Peasants’ Revolt, in the later 1370s, the landlords, and especially
the great landed magnates, had succeeded in obtaining a greater share of the
national income than they had enjoyed before the Black Death.
Some post-Revolt judicial records do provide evidence for the payment of
higher wage rates in some Essex manors, though largely for agricultural workers.
From these records, Nora Kenyon Ritchie concluded that aggressive new
leaseholders of former domain (demesne) lands were more willing to offer
higher wages to attract labor than were traditional manorial lords. Rather
surprisingly, no one has pursued or investigated this intriguing thesis since the
publication of her article, in 1934.80
London’s own 1350 wage ordinance was soon if not immediately allowed
to lapse. For when the Tower Bridge accounts commence in 1381, the prevailing
daily rate then ranged from 7.0d to 7.5d, and indeed for winter months as well
as for the summer. At Westminster Abbey, however, the rate was less, at 6.667d
per day, though with some extra material benefits not given to the Tower Bridge
craftsmen. In the Bishop of Winchester’s Southwark manor, from as early as
1406, and in most London guild houses by 1420, that rate had increased to 8d
daily (without food and drink); and that same rate had become uniform in the
Tower Bridge Master’s accounts from June 1425, though not at Westminster
Abbey until 1439–1440 (perhaps because of those extra benefits given to some
craftsmen).81
VII. MONETARY CHANGES, INFLATION, AND REAL
WAGES, AFTER THE BLACK DEATH, 1348–1375
These rather complex data indicate that the commonly expressed views about
post-Plague wages in England are much oversimplified, in particular the
comment in a recent article by Penn and Dyer (1990, p. 356): that “the evidence
for a rise in both cash wages and real wages . . . coinciding with the sudden
and sustained population decline after the Black Death of 1348–1349 has been
well established.” What must be challenged in this statement is the verdict on
real wages, for the very simple reason that the Black Death, throughout western
Europe, was followed by a horrendous inflation that endured for the ensuing
quarter-century in England, and for an even longer period in Flanders and
Tuscany.82 Thus, as the Tables 4–10 clearly indicate, its initial consequence
was to swamp the rise in nominal wages for most workers, and most especially
for Flemish craftsmen. Note from Table 8 that the Flemish price level soared
from a mean of 50.57 in 1349–1350 to a peak of 124.72 in 1386–1390, an
overall rise of 146.6%. Table 10 provides both the nominal and real wage
Wage Stickiness and Monetary Changes 211
211
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
4259 Ch06  4/12/02  10:12 am  Page 211
indexes (with the same base: 1451–1475 = 100) for master building craftsmen
in Bruges, in quinquennial harmonic means, and also the mean number of
“commodity baskets” that a master mason or carpenter could have purchased
with his estimated annual money-wage income (for an estimated working year
of 210 days). Despite more than a doubling in nominal wages over this period
(in Bruges, from 5d in 1349 to 12d per day in 1387), the real wage index for
Bruges building craftsmen thus fell from a harmonic mean of 89.88 in
1349–1350 (equivalent to 16.440 commodity baskets a year) to one of just
62.31 in 1356–1360 (11.397 commodity baskets), then rose, only to fall again
to 65.90 in 1381–1385 (12.053 baskets), but partially recovering to 77.38 in
1386–1390 (14.152 baskets), with the final increase in money wages. Even so,
real wages for Flemish building craftsmen in the late 1380s were still below
those of the Black Death era itself (Fig. 5).83
In England, urban craftsmen in the small to middle-sized towns, and certainly
most of the manorial craftsmen and other artisans, also did not fare that well
immediately following the Black Death, though certainly they did not fare as
badly as the Flemish craftsmen. As Table 6 indicates, the real wage index for
master masons and carpenters at Oxford, Cambridge and other small to medium
size towns in southern England (Canterbury and Exeter, etc., but excluding
London) did indeed fall in the immediate aftermath of the Black Death: from
a harmonic mean of 55.52 in 1341–1345 to one of just 44.56 in 1351–1355.
Shortly after, however, real wages did recover, reaching an index of 59.01 in
1356–1360, but then fell again to 56.83 in 1361–1365, while rising thereafter.
But even in 1371–1375, the real wage index of 61.61 was still below the mean
index of 63.26 achieved in 1336–1340. Indeed the significant, sustained rise in
this real wage index did not really commence until the later 1370s (Fig. 4).
In many manorial estates, however, especially those of the far-flung rural
holdings of the Bishop of Winchester, building craftsmen had to wait until the
early fifteenth century to achieve a significant gain in their real incomes (at
least those measured in terms of wages given without food and drink): at
Hinderclay, Ecchinswell (Itchingswell), Overton, Taunton, Esher, Wycombe;
and also Battle Abbey, Redgrave manor (Bishop of Bury St Edmonds), and at
Winchester College, to name only a few.84
Monetary Factors in the Post-Plague Inflations
The post-Plague European inflation was again clearly a monetary phenomenon.
Depopulation, after all, according to some disciples of the Postan school, is
supposed to cause deflation, not the opposite. The monetary reasons – if we
properly relate monetary and real variables – are not difficult to seek. As Herlihy
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(1967, p. 125) so aptly commented, “men were dying, but coins were not” (at
least not so quickly). Thus, whatever the current status of western European
precious-metal mining, the effect of such drastic depopulations, perhaps as much
as 40% of the total inhabitants, from bubonic and pneumonic plagues, if not
so much from warfare, was undoubtedly to augment dramatically the per capita
supplies of coined money.
Secondly, the fiscal consequences of warfare in western Europe (including
the concurrent Italian wars), of increased taxes and other levies, evidently also
induced some considerable dishoarding. At the same time the French, Flemish,
Brabantine, Aragonese, and various Italian governments, to mention only a few,
sought both to finance and to facilitate the necessary cash flows for warfare by
engaging in drastic coinage debasements, some severe enough to promote a
veritable “flight from coinage.” The English crown, however, was a singular
exception, by not engaging in these monetary manipulations, which indeed were
so drastic in both France and Flanders: for it undertook only one minor weight-
reduction in its silver coins, in 1351, thereafter maintaining a perfectly stable
coinage, in both metals, until 1411–1412 (Tables 3–4; Fig. 1).85
Thirdly, some historians have suggested that the socio-psychological
consequences of both plague and warfare, especially with such devastating and
arbitrary death tolls, was to foster a fatalistic yet hedonistic spending spree,
facilitated all the more by suddenly inherited cash balances. In support of that
thesis they cite the evidence from paintings, architecture, adornments in dress,
and examples from Italian literature – e.g. Boccaccio’s Decameron.86 The
overall consequence, for England and Flanders, as demonstrated in the Tables
3–4, was to produce a truly momentous increase in coinage outputs, whose
inflationary consequences can hardly be disputed. One will note from Tables 5
(England) and 8 (Flanders) that all three major price series, and not just those
for grains, rose during this quarter-century period following the Black Death:
to the late 1370s in England; and to the 1380s in Flanders, whose far more
drastic and regrettably frequent debasements continued until the 1389–1390
monetary reform.
VIII. “BULLION FAMINES” AND PERIODIC
DEFLATIONS: IN THE LATER FOURTEENTH AND
FIFTEENTH CENTURIES
Thereafter, during the final quarter of the fourteenth-century, much of western
Europe – certainly including England, the Low Countries, Tuscany, and Aragon-
Navarre – experienced an equally dramatic deflation that lasted until well into
the fifteenth century (Tables 4, 5, 8, Figs 2–3).87 Then with the resumption of
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intensive warfare, from the Battle of Agincourt in 1415 to the dénouement of the
Hundred Years’ War in the 1440s, another era of inflation ensued in much of
north-western Europe, especially in France and the Low Countries, which
consequently experienced severe coinage debasements. With the end of the
Hundred Years War, and indeed even earlier, from the early 1440s, that war-
induced inflationary era was succeeded by yet another era of deflation, this time
as prolonged, and by the 1460s, as pronounced as that of the late fourteenth
century. Though temporarily disrupted by warfare, by other “supply shocks,” and
again by severe coinage debasements, especially in the Low Countries during the
1480s, this deflationary trend lasted until about 1515. Its subsequent reversal
marked the beginning of the Price Revolution era. Again, as in all the previous
inflationary and deflationary cycles, the three major price-indexes in both England
and the Low Countries rose and fell more or less together, if by no means exactly
in tandem, during all these fifteenth-century cycles (Tables 4, 5, 8).88
As Tables 3–4 and Figs 1–3 clearly, show these periods of very pronounced
deflation, in the later fourteenth and mid-fifteenth century in particular, were
accompanied by severe slumps in the gold and silver coinage outputs in both
England and Flanders, almost as severe as those for early fourteenth-century
England, while the brief intervening periods of inflation were similarly
accompanied by upsurges in mint outputs.89 If these brief, periodic bouts of
late-medieval inflation can be attributed to a combination of expansionary 
war-induced fiscal and monetary policies, and especially, in the Low Countries,
by severe coinage debasements, the longer periods of deflation are much more
difficult to explain.
Complicating any such analysis is the now large, contradictory, and often
confusing literature on the so-called “Bullion Famines” of this era, from the
1370s to the 1470s. The most favoured theories advanced by proponents of 
the “bullion famine” thesis are the following three. First, that western Europe
experienced a severe worsening of the late-medieval mining slump, so that even
the opening of some new mines in Serbia and Sardinia failed to compensate
for the sharp decline in outputs elsewhere, and indeed a veritable cessation of
silver mining in some regions. Second, that western Europe suffered a steadily
worsening of balance-of-payments deficit with Asia, with consequent bullion
outflows via the Levant and the eastern Baltic; and third that this deficit was
aggravated by a severe diminution, though not a complete cessation, in European
gold imports from the Italian trade with North Africa.90
Nevertheless, if Ashtor has provided some impressive evidence for Venice’s
large silver exports to the Levant in the later fifteenth century, there is no concrete
evidence to show that an overall European balance-of-payments deficit had been
worsening from a full century earlier.91 Indeed, a major factor that helped to end
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the so-called “bullion famine” era was the Central European silver-copper
mining-boom, which began during the very nadir of deflation in the 1460s, when
the consequently high value of silver induced a veritable revolution in mining
technology (in chemical and civil engineering). That boom augmented European
silver production by over five-fold by the 1540s; and without such large increases
in its silver stocks, Venice would never have been able to conduct such an
increased volume and value of trade with the Levant in the 1490s.92 The fact,
moreover, that even before that mining boom had commenced, mints in England,
France, and the Low Countries had all succeeded in reviving, if not in fully
recovering, former levels of coinage outputs, in the 1420s and early 1430s,
suggests that there was no downward linear trend indicating any general drainage
of European bullion to the “East.” Thus, additional, if not alternative, explanations
for periodic bullion scarcities should be sought for this era.
Such an explanation may be found in examining the behavior of bullion flows
rather than of monetary stocks: specifically, in two sets of adverse changes in
the income velocity of money, or in the demand for idle cash balances, that
may be related to the pernicious effects of warfare and plagues, from the 1370s.
First, the now chronic and even more devastating warfare throughout so much
of Europe, combined with drastic depopulations, produced severe dislocations
to established patterns of international trade, while sharply raising transaction
costs in that commerce, thus even more reducing flows of both commodities
and bullion. Worse, responses to the ancillary manifestations of that warfare,
in terms of commercial blockades, confiscations, and especially coinage debase-
ments, radically reduced bullion flows even more. In particular, most west
European rulers, in defending themselves against aggressive debasements by
their neighbors, necessarily banned the domestic circulation of most foreign
coins, especially silver coins (all the more subject to surreptitious debasements);
and such bans also stipulated that all or most foreign coin be surrendered as
bullion to the ruler’s mints. More important, in seeking to attract more bullion
to their own mints, to increase coinage outputs and their seigniorage revenues,
virtually all rulers banned its export. Even when enforcement of those bans
failed to prevent international exchanges of precious metals, they still depressed
monetary and trade flows by raising transaction costs.
Finally, the noxious combination of such warfare, famines, plagues, the
imposition of higher taxes and such monetary policies, defensive or aggressive,
and the consequent commercial disruptions led to periodic but often severe
economic depressions, certainly commencing by the late 1370s and 1380s. Such
conditions also bred a more general climate of insecurity and pessimism that
further discouraged spending and investment, increased hoarding, and further
aggravated those depressions. Thus, by the 1370s, that post-Plague social climate
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of hedonistic spending-sprees had given way to much more pervasively gloomy
and pessimistic outlooks amongst the populace in general, one that increased
their demand for idle cash-balances, i.e. elevated their tendency to hoard.93
While fourteenth-century England has provided an unusual number of extant
coin hoards, their survival may be accidental and their evidence is inconclu-
sive.94 Better evidence of late-medieval hoarding, especially following the Black
Death, can be found in the greatly increased use of gold and silver ornamentation
in the form of plate, jewellery, brocaded textiles, belt buckles, wall hangings,
and furniture. Such ostentatious artistic display provided not only aesthetic
satisfaction but also a feasible means of storing precious metals that could
readily be restored to coinage, when so needed.95
Hoarding is obviously a self-justifying deflationary phenomenon; for, as
prices fell from all combined circumstances of monetary contraction, the rational
response of the money-holding populace would have been to save rather than
to spend in the present, in anticipation of even lower prices in the future.
Furthermore, the general forces of more gentle, less disruptive population
decline, with smaller communities and smaller families, may also have acted
to curb the income-velocity of money, i.e. to increase the relative demand for
real cash balances.
Finally, for England itself, one may cite a particularly significant monetary
change: the fact that the overwhelming bulk of the coinage, sometimes as much
as 95% by value, was struck in gold rather than silver – and gold coinages are
necessarily undertaken at the expense of silver (Table 3).96 For if the smallest
circulating gold coin, the quarter-noble, worth 20d or 20 current silver pence
could purchase 20 gallons of ale or loaves of bread, one can readily imagine
that its velocity in circulation would have been very low, compared to that of
a silver pence or halfpence.
IX. THE QUESTION OF LATE-MEDIEVAL CREDIT:
AND THE EFFECTIVE MONEY SUPPLY
Nevertheless, according to many historians, a supposed growth in the use of
credit during the later Middle Ages should have fully offset or counteracted
those deflationary forces: particularly through the agency of deposit-and-transfer
banking and bills-of-exchange banking. Yet neither was an innovation in this
era, and both saw their most rapid initial diffusion in the last half-century of
the preceding Commercial Revolution era (c.1180–c.1320). The reasons why
credit instruments largely failed to provide a sufficient remedy for periodic
monetary contractions in late-medieval Europe are very complex, but may be
briefly summarized here.
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First, late-medieval Europe experienced very few additional innovations; and
most credit instruments were still far from being effective substitutes for coined
money, with the possible though still dubious exceptions to be found in a few
West-European towns whose commerce was dominated by Italian merchant-
bankers. Second, much more widespread and more powerful forces, economic
and political, involving increased hostility from both Church and state, seriously
impeded the employment or circulation of credit, with a multitude of examples
to be cited in England, France, the Low Countries, and many Hanse towns, if
not so much in Italy itself. Indeed, in both England and the Low Countries,
late-medieval nationalist monetary policies effectively prevented the emergence
of deposit-banking in the former, and virtually closed down such banks in 
the latter, following the Burgundian unification of the Low Countries, in a 
series of ever more severe ordinances (1433–1435, 1467, 1480 and 1489).
Furthermore, various Burgundian ordinances, both ducal and municipal, also
sought to restrict pawnbroking (1442, 1451, 1457, 1473, 1477).97
Third, because of those increasingly hostile attitudes from state-dominated
legal institutions, despite the growth of a more independent and international
Law-Merchant, the enforcement of debt repayments, especially those involving
(non-notarized) holograph documents, became even more costly and ineffective,
thus restricting credit instruments to a small circle of merchants, chiefly Italian,
who knew and trusted each other. Fourth, most European states and principal-
ities, even in Italy, had failed to provide the legal institutions and sanctions for
true negotiability: the conversion of a debt instrument into cash or goods, or
to be used in place of cash, as the fundamentally necessary condition to permit
credit instruments effectively to augment the money supply (Munro, 1994b,
2000). Fifth, consequently and in sum, credit instruments were far from being
divorced from the use of coined money. Spooner (1972, pp. 3, 53–71), Mueller
(1984), Spufford (1986, pp. 346–348), and Nightingale (1990) have all effec-
tively demonstrated that credit either expanded or contracted with the coined
money supply in the late-medieval and early-modern economies, usually in a
non-proportional fashion. As Mayhew (1987, p. 121) so aptly commented as
well: “credit reflected the supply of coin rather than compensated for it.”
X. THE LATE-MEDIEVAL DEFLATIONS, WAGE
STICKINESS, AND THE COURSE OF REAL WAGES:
ENGLAND, 1376–1500
With the onset of this general and very widespread deflation,98 wage stickiness
now assumed a significance never before revealed in European economic
history. For in England, at least, unlike its experience in the second quarter of
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the fourteenth-century, most money wages did not decline (Fig. 4). Beveridge
(1936, p. 31) was the first to call attention to this phenomenon, commenting
that “from 1290 to 1379, money wages and the price of wheat move decade
by decade always in the same direction, rising and falling together; thereafter
they part company completely.” To explain this striking dichotomy, he argued
that the socio-economic consequences of the Black Death and subsequent
plagues were to transform money wages from their original institution “as a
substitute either for customary service or for allowances in kind,” both tied to
living costs, into true payments determined by the actual labor market.99 The
previously noted fall in the proportion of the wage typically paid in kind, from
about one-half before the Black Death to one third thereafter, provides some
support to Beveridge’s thesis.
In his now classic article on the Black Death, however, Bridbury (1973) came
to a strikingly different conclusion: namely, that the initial mortality from that
disaster “was quite incapable of altering the social and economic relationships
because so much of the population was surplus by the fourteenth century;” that
the Plague was “more purgative than toxic;” and that not until the later 1370s
did cumulative depopulation succeed in fundamentally altering the land : labor
ratio to raise labor productivity and thus real wages. Though his arguments
should not be dismissed out of hand, they are not really supported by the wage
and price evidence, nor by economic theory and logic.100
In fact, what one now witnesses, from the late 1370s, is the nominal and
real-wage pattern that will prevail, certainly in Western Europe, for the next
six centuries.101 With a few but significant exceptions, to be noted later 
(pp. 226–230), real wages in England, and then subsequently in the southern
Low Countries as well, began a century long rise that was fundamentally if not
exclusively due to wage stickiness with prolonged deflation. Again with just a
few exceptions, the only significant retreats in this onward march of rising real
wages, were similarly the result, and sole result, of some periodic and generally
brief inflations, which were far more prominent in the Low Countries than in
England (Tables 5–6, 8–14).
Yet it would be wrong to rule real factors entirely out of court; and one
may justifiably postulate that the Classical theory does retain some merit.
Possibly the high real wages recorded in England and Flanders during the
mid-fifteenth century, during these prolonged conditions of both deflation
and wage stickiness, were justified, in “clearing labor markets,” so to speak,
if there had been some accompanying rise in the marginal revenue product
of the artisans enjoying such high wages. How in particular are we to explain
the undoubtedly widespread rise in nominal wages during the early to mid-
fifteenth century, in both England and then in Flanders, despite generally
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prevailing low prices, thus further increasing the real wages, without some
productivity increases?
In the southern Low Countries real-wages for building craftsmen reached
their medieval peak in the mid-1460s (Tables 10, 13, 14, Figs 5–6) and in
southern England that peak occurred a decade later: in 1477, when RWI =
123.76 (harmonic mean of 111.04 for 1476–1480: Table 6, Fig. 4). Shortly after
that peak, however, those English real wages fell quite sharply, to a harmonic
mean of 78.51 in 1481–1485, because of a sharp rise in the price level (to
127.38: Table 5). Why it did so, however, is more difficult to explain than the
contemporaneous though more prolonged rise in the Flemish and Brabantine
price level (Tables 8–9), which was primarily due to drastic coinages debase-
ments and supply shocks from warfare (see below, pp. 224–226). Thereafter,
English prices fell sharply to a mean of just 96.70 in 1496–1500, thus producing
a rise in the craftsmen’s real wage index to 103.41. Not until 1516–1520, with
the swift onset of the Price Revolution in England, did they sustain a sharp
fall, to just 83.03 (harmonic mean); and then, during even the initial phases of
the Price Revolution, their real wages continued to plunge swiftly (to 50.78 in
1551–1555). But that phenomenon is beyond the scope of this current study,
which must terminate in 1500.
XI. DEFLATION, WAGE STICKINESS AND THE
COURSE OF REAL WAGES IN FLANDERS: THE CASE
OF THE FULLERS, 1375–1430
As just suggested, late-medieval Flanders and Brabant provide both fascinating
comparisons and contrasts with the contemporary English experience in real
wages. The first and certainly the most interesting comparison concerns the fate
of Flemish textile artisans, with a case study of the fullers, and then of building
craftsmen, during the equally sharp deflation of the very late fourteenth and
early fifteenth centuries. In Flanders itself, as Tables 3–4 and 8 clearly indicate,
the steep decline in coinage outputs and fall in the price-level had commenced
about a decade after such phenomena had become apparent in England, from
the very late 1380s. Despite a recoinage, with full-scale monetary reform in the
early 1390s, coin outputs fell throughout that decade, ending in 1402 with a
complete closure of the mints (Table 3). At the same time, Flanders’ composite
price level (1451–1475 = 100) fell from a peak of 133.93 in 1387 to just 82.12
in 1405, a fall of 38.7% (Table 5). Aggravating this steep deflation, though by
no means solely responsible for it, was Duke Philip the Bold’s dramatic
monetary reform of 1389–1390, a renforcement that strengthened the silver
coinage by 31.6% – i.e. in reminting the current debased coinage into fewer
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coins, but with a much higher silver content. That ordinance also altered the
mint ratio in favor of silver (from 10.41 : 1 to 9.68 : 1), thereby reducing the
value of the Flemish gold noble from 102d to 72d groot.102
Almost immediately, in 1390, the Burgundian ducal government, along with
many town governments, stipulated a proportional reduction in wages and some
other money-of-account payments, in order to accommodate these changes, and
in particular to compensate those merchants, textile industrialists, and financiers
who had depended upon payments in gold nobles. Indeed, a wage reduction
inversely proportional to the silver renforcement of 31.6% would have been
exactly 24.0%.103 Thus, in Bruges, the daily money-wages of building craftsmen,
which had risen during the inflationary 1380s, though not by as much as the
extent of general inflation, were abruptly and arbitrarily cut by 25%: from 12d
to 9d groot, for masters; and from 6.0d to 4.5d, for journeymen.104 According
to some contemporary reports, such wage reductions did produce riots and
considerable social unrest in Bruges and other Flemish cities.105
In retrospect, civil disturbances in Flanders were rather less pronounced than
might have been expected. But presumably only the guild artisans, a minority,
were in position to voice strong objections; and evidently many, if not all of
them, grudgingly accepted the argument that their new wages, while nominally
lower, were being paid in the new “strong” rather than the old “weak” money.106
Quite evidently wage reductions were imposed much more easily under condi-
tions of a publicly promulgated coinage renforcement, when the public could
readily perceive the physical differences between the new and old coinages,
than under deflationary conditions without any such coinage changes.107
Nevertheless the various attempts by Flemish weaver-drapers to impose
similar wage cuts during the early 1390s did produce some labor strife in the
Flemish cloth industry. Only the fullers, however, have left us any concrete
records of concerted opposition, and only in three drapery towns: Ghent,
Wervik, and Kortrijk. That opposition of course depended upon the relative
strength of their ambachten or guilds.
The weakest were evidently the Ghent fullers, who, in 1361, had lost both
their representation in the town government and the right to select their own
leaders.108 In 1373, their weaver-draper employers had brutally crushed a fullers’
strike; but Count Louis de Male – no friend of the weavers – nevertheless
awarded them a wage increase: to 45d groot Flemish, for a master and two
journeymen, in fulling a maerclaken broadcloth in three days (the earlier wage
is unknown). Thereafter, unlike the building craftsmen in Bruges, they failed
in all attempts to gain further wage increases.109 Then, with the implementation
of the 1390 monetary reform, they evidently accepted, without protest, a 29%
reduction in their combined money wage, to 32d groot.110 Since the inflationary
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conditions of the 1380s still prevailed, that meant that their real wage was
41.4% lower than what they had earned in 1373 – but only for that year. As
Tables 8 and 11 reveal, rapid deflation soon came to their rescue, so that their
mean real wage – as measured in the number of Flemish commodity baskets
acquired with their annual money wage income – in 1396–1400 (6.913 baskets)
was 7.2% higher than a decade earlier (6.451 baskets in 1386–1390), though
still 9.3% lower than what they had enjoyed in 1373–1375 (7.620 baskets).
Not until 1423, after a renewed, debasement-induced inflation and another
prolonged strike, would the Ghent fullers obtain any further raise in their money
wages, to 40d groot per cloth. Even so, their real wage in 1426–1430 (mean
of 6.589 baskets) was still below that earned in the late 1390s, and 13.5% below
that of 1373–1375 (Table 11; Munro, 2002). Thus, during the later fourteenth
and early fifteenth centuries, the Ghent fullers experienced not a Golden Age
but an almost continuous decline in their real wages, apart from some
stabilization during the very deflationary 1390s.
Somewhat more successful were the fullers in the small drapery town of
Wervik, now a major leader of the younger, more aggressive, so-called nouvelles
draperies, which were faring rather better than the traditional draperies of the drie
steden – those of Ghent, Ypres, Bruges – especially in Mediterranean markets
(Melis, 1962; Munro, 1999). Soon after the 1390 renforcement, the seigneur and
bailiff of Wervik’s feudal seigneury decreed an immediate reduction of 27% in the
fullers’ pay: from 48d to 35d groot per cloth, which still left them better off than
the Ghent fullers. Nevertheless, in May 1392, the Wervik fullers’ guild, after
threatening to go on strike, appealed this decree to the ducal Council of Flanders.
The ducal council, however, ruled in favor of the Wervik drapers and their bailiff,
forcing the fullers to accept this new wage rate, which was subsequently ratified
by the new Wervik drapery keuren in October 1397.111
Of the three recorded disputes, the Kortrijk fullers, employed by a nouvelle
draperie that rivalled Wervik’s in importance, fared the best, perhaps because
they had responded much earlier and much more vigorously in their protests.
Like the Ghent fullers, they also had not received any increase in money wages
since 1374, despite the subsequently severe inflation (Tables 8, 12).112 When
the Kortrijk weaver-drapers attempted to impose a cut in their wages, though
a more modest one of 22%, from 41d to 32d groot per broadcloth (the same
rate imposed at Ghent), the fullers guild appealed to Duke Philip’s councillors
for arbitration. In imposing a new wage of 36d groot, and thus a relatively
minor 12% reduction in the nominal wage, Duke Philip’s councillors split the
difference between the weaver-drapers and the fullers.113
The real winners of this Kortrijk labor contract were surely the fullers, who,
despite that reduction, soon found themselves much better off because of the
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stark deflation that quickly ensued, from the early 1390s (Tables 8, 12). As
indicated earlier, the fall in the mean Flemish price index over the 1390s was
somewhat greater than the extent of the renforcement: i.e. 29.0% vs. 24.0%.114
Thus, by 1396–1400 the mean purchasing power of wages for the Kortrijk
journeymen fullers, expressed in terms of commodity baskets, was 26.2% higher
than it had been during the debasement years, in the quinquennium 1386–1390.
In 1399, their real-wage was 58.4% above what they had been earning in 1390
when their contract had been imposed (i.e. 8.479 commodity baskets a year vs.
5.352 baskets); and their mean real wage in the 1390s was the highest that they
had achieved (at least since the Black Death). But they, too, experienced a dete-
rioration in the real wages after renewed coinage debasements and the
consequent inflation from 1416. Thus, in 1426–30, despite having gained a
money wage increase in 1429 (from 36d to 40d groot per cloth), these Kortrijk
fullers were receiving a real wage (mean of 6.432 baskets) that was also lower
than that earned during the early 1390s, by 10.6% (Table 12).
XII. DEFLATION, INFLATION, AND REAL WAGES:
OTHER URBAN CRAFTSMEN IN FLANDERS AND
BRABANT, 1370–1500
In Flanders, the building craftsmen of Ghent and Bruges, and the policemen in
the latter town, did fare considerably better during the very end of the four-
teenth and early fifteenth centuries; though clearly, even for them, the fifteenth
century as a whole was also far from being a consistent Golden Age. Only the
Bruges wage data are shown, in Table 10 and Fig. 5, because the craftsmen’s
wages in the two towns were virtually identical throughout the fifteenth century
(or to the late 1480s, when the accounts cease recording daily wages for
individual craftsmen); and they of course demonstrate the same relative degree
of wage stickiness.
Initially, with the abrupt 25% cut in nominal wages with the 1390 monetary
reform, from 12d to 9d groot, the Bruges building craftsmen did suffer a very
brief if substantial drop in real income, of 30.2%, before the aforementioned
deflation became more pronounced. During the 1390s, their real wage rose
by 76.0%; and in the latter part of the decade it did so because, in 1396–1397,
these craftsmen received a partial restoration of their former nominal wage:
masters, to 10d groot; and journeymen, from 4.5d to 5.0d groot. Their real
wage index peaked in 1399, at 110.37 (= 20.187 commodity baskets); but that
was only 6.5% more than the amount earned in 1388 (18.953 baskets).
However, the quinquennial wage for 1396–1400, measured in such commodity
baskets (18.241 = RWI 99.73) was substantially higher, by 28.89%, than the
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mean number of 14.152 baskets (RWI = 77.38) earned a decade earlier in
1386–1390.115
During the early 1390s, the Bruges policemen fared somewhat better than
did the building craftsmen and fullers because their wages had not been reduced
(Table 11, Fig. 5) – after all, they were expected to maintain social order with
the arbitrary pay cuts. Furthermore, though paid only 6d per day, they were
paid for the full year (i.e. 365 days), rather than for the estimated mean of 210
days for a master building craftsmen. Thus, their annual real wage in 1390 was
substantially higher, with an estimated purchasing power of 13.288 baskets,
compared to 11.468 baskets for a master carpenter or mason. Finally, in 1398,
they did suffer a delayed reduction in their money wages, though only 16.7%
(to 5d); but unlike the craftsmen their money-wages were never again restored
(for the duration of the wage records, to 1476). In 1399, their annual real wage
income, having peaked in 1393, was also now just 87% of that earned by master
masons and carpenters: 17.037 vs. 20.187 baskets; but that was still well more
than double the amount earned that year by journeymen fullers (7.537 baskets
in Ghent; and 8.479 baskets in Kortrijk). The real wages for Bruges policemen
continued to remain fairly high, until just before the Battle of Agincourt (14.613
baskets in 1414, but 18.161 baskets in 1411).
Thereafter, with Burgundian involvement in the resumption of more serious
warfare in northern France, and with renewed debasements in and after 1416
(Munro, 1973, pp. 65–126), their real wages and those for Bruges’ master
building craftsmen once more began to fall, and then fell sharply. The reason
is quite simple to comprehend: prices rose with the coinage debasements
(1416–1433), and then, during the 1430s, with costly warfare as well, from a
mean index of 95.31 in 1411–1415 to one of 140.166 in 1436–1440, while their
money wages remained generally fixed, at 10d for building craftsmen and 5d
for policemen. From 1432, however, some craftsmen began receiving higher
wages of 11d and 12d; but that was hardly enough to offset the ravages of
inflation, so that, over this entire period, from 1411–1415 to 1436–1440, the
real wage index of Bruges craftsmen fell from a harmonic mean of 95.38 (17.446
commodity baskets) to one of 69.45 (12.703 baskets). Indeed, in the worst year,
1439, with plague, famine, and war, their real wage index (47.57 = 8.702
baskets) was only 75.87 per as much as in the previous annus horribilus, 1390
(RWI = 62.70 = 11.468 baskets).
According to many (if not all) economic historians, the ensuing three decades
were an era of very severe commercial, financial, and agrarian depression for
both England and the southern Low Countries. To be sure, the latter still
remained by far the wealthiest and most economically advanced region in north-
ern Europe – a veritable “promised land,” in the eyes of many contemporaries;
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but at this very time, the southern Low Countries were also experiencing, and
largely independently of the current depression, the rapid decline of their
traditional luxury woolens industry, in the face of relentless English competition
in European cloth markets.116 Nevertheless, in this same period, the real wage
index for Bruges building craftsmen soared once again, by a remarkable
169.75%: from 45.57 in 1439 (8.702 baskets) to reach a high of 128.33 (23.472
commodity baskets) in 1464 – just before the next round of debasements. Again
real wages had risen so strongly, principally, because this was a period of stark
deflation, and, as noted, of very low mint outputs, sometimes with only a bare
trickle of coinage – one factor, though not the only one, that precipitated the
renewal of debasements in 1466 (Tables 3–4, 8–10; Figs 3, 5). But this time, 
the Bruges craftsmen had also gained from an increase in their mean nominal
wage: by about 1440, most craftsmen were receiving a summer wage of 12d –
and some throughout the year – but a reduced winter wage of 10d, so that the
median wage had risen from 10.0d to 10.8d and then to 11d groot.
The subsequent era of war-inspired and debasement-induced inflations again
brought real wages tumbling down, as Table 10 indicates; but unfortunately the
Bruges wage payment series terminate in the mid-1480s.117 In the mid-sized
town of Aalst, to the east of Ghent, however, the daily wage rates for master
masons and carpenters remained fixed at 6d groot per day until well into the
early sixteenth century, though some senior craftsmen were earning 7d to 8d
daily; but after 1510–1511, more and more such craftsmen were earning these
higher rates of 7d and 8d (up to the 1530s).118
In the neighbouring duchy of Brabant, to the east, the price and wage history
of the towns was, not surprisingly, similar to that of Flanders, following 
the Burgundian monetary unification and reform of 1434–1435. But before the
Burgundian acquisition of Brabant in 1430, and that monetary reform, their
monetary, price, and thus wage history had been quite different, as Tables 9,
13–14 and Figs 5–6 show (employing the same base, 1451–1475 = 100, for prices
and wages). With far more drastic coinage debasements in early fifteenth-century
Brabant (under Dukes Antoine, Jan IV, and Philip van Sint-Pol, 1406–1430), the
real wages of Antwerp’s master masons and carpenters had plunged by about
one-third, in the three decades from 1410 (Table 13): from a mean of 100.30 in
1401–1405 (10.262 commodity baskets per work year of 210 days, seasonally
adjusted for the winter wage) to a mean of just 66.437 in 1436–1440 (6.840
commodity baskets per year; with a nadir of 5.281 such baskets in 1437).119
Thereafter, as in Flanders, their real wage index soared strongly, well more than
doubling, to peak at a harmonic mean of 109.81 in 1461–1465 (11.156
commodity baskets for both Antwerp masons and Mechelen carpenters; but
11.404 baskets for Mechelen masons, with a higher winter wage: Tables 13–14).
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The mid-century deflation reached its very nadir in this same quinquennium,
which, as noted earlier, also marks the peak period of real wages for master
building craftsmen in Bruges (RWI = 112.733); but the latter continued to enjoy
a substantially higher level of real wages, which would have purchased a mean
of 20.619 Flemish commodity baskets in that quinquennium (Table 10).
Subsequently, as Tables 13–14 and Fig. 6 show, the real wages for master
building craftsmen in Antwerp and Mechelen plunged severely, with the series
of inflationary coinage debasements undertaken by Archduke Maximilian of
Austria during his wars with France and the very destructive civil wars in the
now Habsburg Netherlands (from 1477 to 1493: see Tables 3–4). Consequently
the real-wage index for Antwerp’s master masons fell to a low of 61.883 in
1486–1490 (a harmonic mean of 6.316 commodity baskets), even though they
were now earning a mean daily summer wage of 12.9d; for Mechelen’s masons,
earning a lesser mean daily wage of 12.3d, the real wage index fell to 58.587
(for an equivalent annual income of 6.099 commodity baskets).120
The Peace of Senlis in May 1493 (with France), permitting a much need
coinage renforcement, brought monetary stability and renewed deflation, though
this time with somewhat greater economic prosperity, certainly for Brabant (Van
der Wee, 1963, Vol II, pp. 113–142). Real wages thus recovered, and this time
even more strongly in Mechelen, to 97.53 in 1496–1500 (= 10.276 commodity
baskets), because in 1490 its town masons had received a more substantial rise
in their daily summer wage: to 13.5d. The daily summer wage for Antwerp
masons was increased to only 12.5d, and only in 1497, so that in 1496–1500 their
RWI was only 89.522 (or the seasonally adjusted annual equivalent of 9.039
commodity baskets). Thereafter, the real wages of building craftsmen in Brabant
drifted slowly downwards, and then, with the onset of the Price Revolution, from
c. 1515, rather more rapidly. Thus, the RWI for Antwerp masons in 1521–1525
was just 71.548 (harmonic mean). Nevertheless, during the subsequent history
of the Price Revolution, lasting until the 1640s, building craftsmen in the major
towns of Brabant did not, in general, experience the same drastic fall that their
brethren did in southern England, as noted earlier (see pp. 188, 219). That history,
of course, lies entirely beyond the scope of this study.
But if the wage experience of the Brabantine building craftsmen differed so
markedly from the English during the Price Revolution, so it did as well for
much of the fifteenth century, thus illuminating again the dangers of viewing
the changing fortunes of late-medieval European craftsmen merely through an
English lens. Only during the middle decades of the fifteenth century were the
experiences of such craftsmen reasonably similar in both England and the Low
Countries. But if prolonged deflation thus allowed so many craftsmen in both
countries to experience a Golden Age, those who benefited from wage-stickiness,
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one must not forget that it was also an era of severe economic depression (see
above, pp. 223–224).
XIII. SOME FIFTEENTH-CENTURY ANOMALIES:
WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND FALLING REAL WAGES IN
(CHIEFLY) RURAL AREAS IN THE LOW COUNTRIES
AND ENGLAND
Yet even these decades were far from being a “Golden Age” for all craftsmen,
artisans, and laborers. We may doubt that many artisans and workers in the
now rapidly declining woolen cloth industries were enjoying much prosperity;
but we lack adequate wage data for any textile artisans from the 1440s. We
do, however, possess abundant wage data for craftsmen and laborers, in the
smaller towns and rural areas of both countries; and they also do not indicate
that all of them shared in this so-called Golden Age. The most illuminating are
those to be found in some Flemish villages to the east of Ghent (Table 15).
By the 1420s, the daily summer wage rates for many carpenters, masons, and
thatchers, in Afsne, St. Denijs (Maalte), and Destelbergen, had risen to 10d
groot Flemish, as in Bruges and Ghent; and those rates prevailed for the next
three decades, to surpass indeed the wages earned by similar craftsmen in
Antwerp and Mechelen (from 1434: 10d groot Flemish = 15d groot Brabant).
But during the deflationary 1450s and 1460s, the wage-rates for many of these
village craftsmen fell. At Afsne, St. Denijs (Maalte), and Destelbergen, those
for carpenters and thatchers fell by 30%: to 8d, then 7.5d, and finally to 7.0d,
by 1470. The decline in nominal wages for thatchers at Zaffelare was about
25%, from the late 1430s to the late 1450s (rising thereafter); and at Zevergem,
only about 20% (Table 15), and only from the later 1450s. Despite the strong
deflation of this era, their real-wages also finally did decline, though of course
to a much lesser extent. Measured by the number of commodity baskets
purchased with the annual money wage, carpenters and thatchers of Afsne and
St. Denijs suffered the sharpest fall: from 15.12 baskets in 1446–1450 to 12.06
baskets in 1466–1470. For all craftsmen in all six villages, this real-wage
measure fell from a mean 12.492 baskets in 1431–1435 to 10.857 baskets in
1436–1440, then rose to 13.893 baskets in 1451–1455, and again fell sharply
to 10.025 baskets in 1456–1460, recovering to just 12.222 baskets in 1466–1470.
Such evidence may support Van der Wee’s contention (1963, Vol. II, pp. 61–73)
that the agricultural sector suffered the most severely from this mid-fifteenth
century “depression.”
But even in the urban sector, some building craftsmen enjoyed rather less
wage-stickiness and suffered some reduction in at least their nominal wages,
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as can be seen in Table 14, for Mechelen. Thus, the master carpenters employed
by Mechelen’s Onse Lieve Vrouw Hospital, after having received a raise in
their daily summer wages, from 9d to 12d (= 8d groot Flemish) in 1441, had
those wages cut back to 9d in 1448; and the former rate of 12d rate was restored
only in 1458 (and then prevailed until 1498). Day labourers working for this
same hospital suffered by far the worst wage cuts in this deflationary era: from
a peak of 8d groot Brabant in 1444 to a low of 5d in 1458, a decline of 38%.
Measured in commodity baskets, their mean real wage declined from a peak
of 6.348 units per year in 1446–1450 to a mean of 4.724 units in 1466–1470,
a fall of 25.6%.
Nor were such nominal wage cuts in the midst of the fifteenth-century
deflationary Golden Age limited to the Low Countries. For England during this
era, Mate (1986) has provided some similar evidence for rural workers in Kent
and Sussex: with nominal wage-reductions up to 30% for mowers at Barton,
Kent, in the 1440s (enduring to the 1470s); cuts of 20% for ploughmen at Wye,
in Sussex, in the 1440s; and of 20% for carpenters at Lullington, Sussex, in
the 1450s. Furthermore, even earlier, during the deflation of the later fourteenth-
century, the various decennial means of English wages published by Thorold
Rogers (1866, 1882, 1903), Steffen (1901–1905), and Beveridge (1936, 1955)
indicate that many rural workers then also evidently suffered some reductions
in their daily wages from 1380 to 1400: as much as 29.4% for wheat threshers
in S.E. England and 26.9% for Westminster farm laborers. But doubts about
the statistical methods used to compile these means, especially when direct
comparisons are made with the actual manorial accounts, prevent one from
asserting that the nominal wages for each class and grade of worker fell, or
fell as much as portrayed in these decennial indexes.121
XIV. SOME CONCLUSIONS ON LATER-MEDIEVAL
WAGE STICKINESS AND REAL WAGES
From this study of the behavior of both nominal and real wages in late-medieval
England and the Low Countries, one may draw a number of conclusions that
significantly alter some standard perceptions about living standards for English
and indeed west European craftsmen and laborers during this era. First, the
Black Death did not immediately usher in a “Golden Age of the Laborer.” Even
in England, which escaped the ravages of war that plagued so much of late-
medieval Europe, and which enjoyed greater economic, social, and monetary
stability than most regions, there is no evidence for a pronounced and sustained
rise in real wages for craftsmen and laborers until about a quarter-century after
the Black Death; indeed many wage earners had suffered some fall in real
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wages in the decade following the Black Death. In the Low Countries, a similar
pronounced and sustained rise in real wages did not commence until the 1390s,
after an even more drastic fall in real wages after the Black Death (Table 10).
Second, the prime if not the complete explanation for the sustained rise in
real wages, in both England and the Low Countries, that did commence in the
later fourteenth century was a combination of institutional wage-stickiness with
prolonged, deep deflation. Third, institutional wage-stickiness itself became a
prevalent feature of labor markets in both England and the Low Countries only
during and from that final quarter of the fourteenth century. Thus, during the
steep deflation that struck England in the quarter-century before the Black Death,
many if not all money wages did in fact fall, though most fell less than did
commodity prices, so that many building craftsmen then did enjoy some increase
in real wages. After the Black Death, furthermore, in both England and the
Low Countries, nominal wages did of course rise; and they were thus not partic-
ularly sticky during the severe inflation that ensued for about a quarter century
(for four decades in Flanders), even if money wages did not fully keep pace
with prices for much of that era. In the fifteenth century, however, wages for
many building craftsmen, in both England and the Low Countries, were quite
sticky even during the two major periods of inflation, which was generally more
severe in the latter region. But, in a much longer historical perspective, from
the late fourteenth to late nineteenth centuries, money wages were generally
much more sticky during deflationary than inflationary periods, because of the
so-called “ratchet effect.”
Fourth, even if nominal wage stickiness became all the more pronounced and
widespread during the fifteenth century, in both England and the Low Countries,
it never became universal, and was to be found much more frequently in large
towns than in villages and the countryside. Not surprisingly, urban craftsmen
in the building trades, and especially those employed by town governments or
large institutions, were far more likely to enjoy conditions of downward wage
stickiness than were the presumably less well organized and less well protected
rural and especially agricultural workers. Even so, some urban exceptions are
to be noted: in particular, as shown in this study, employees of Mechelen’s
Onse Lieve Vrouw hospital. Why wage stickiness became so much more
pronounced from the later fourteenth century but never became universal are
subjects for further research.
Finally, if the central conclusion of this study remains valid, namely that the
most pronounced rise in real wages occurred during strongly deflationary eras
and chiefly by those enjoying such nominal wage-stickiness, we cannot totally
rule out the role of productivity changes in elevating those real wages, even if
they are difficult to discern.
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The more fitting conclusion would be to return to the Keynesian view of
such wage rigidity during periods of inflation, at least according to some
standard macroeconomics textbooks, namely a situation that “results in a higher
real wage and a reduction in the demand for labor,” so that “employment
declines and so does output”; and so very often, “a decline in demand leads to
a prolonged recession” (Wilton-Prescott, 1987, pp. 216–218). The available
evidence does not permit us to ascertain whether such conditions, especially in
the depression era of the mid-fifteenth century, led to increased unemployment
– apart from evident unemployment in the declining Flemish and Brabantine
cloth industries (Munro, 1983b, 1994, 1995, 1999a). Some evidence, discussed
above, does suggest that employment for most craftsmen, was normally discon-
tinuous or “discrete” in this late-medieval era; and such conditions may well
have reduced the number of days in which they secured paid employment. On
the other hand, as suggested either, such unemployment may have been more
voluntary than involuntary, if they were satisfied to accept more days of
leisure.122
One should also note that, under such deflationary conditions, the typical
employer faced and still faces not only a potential rise in his real labor costs,
but even more certainly a rise in the cost of borrowing capital. For the effect
of such deflation is to increase real interest rates (i.e. the nominal rate minus
the inflation rate, or plus the deflation rate), all the more so, since the histor-
ical evidence rarely if ever indicates a commensurate fall in nominal interest
rates. Rash, however, would be the economic historian who would contend that
every deflationary period that also experienced downward wage stickiness for
much of the labor force was also one of recession or depression. Two such
periods in the modern era with these characteristics were the so-called “Great
Depressions” of 1873–1896 and 1929–1939. But if economic historians now
doubt that such a label can justifiably be fixed to the first of these, despite some
cyclical downswings, certainly the latter was a true Great Depression.
Interpreting real-wage trends is also fraught with other dangers. Thus, even
if the amount of labor (L) was diminishing, relative to the employed stock of
land and capital (whose sum is K), as evidently did occur in late-medieval
Europe, and even if labor then enjoyed a rise in real wages, the European labor
force may not have gained an increased share of the national income. That
would have occurred only if the elasticity of substitution between L and K, as
the ratio of the marginal products of land + capital and of labor (yK/yL) had
been less than unity:123 that is, if: yK/yL = SKL < 1.
Finally, a word of caution and a plea for some historical perspective. As
important and as vexing as is the question of real-wage trends in the late-
medieval economy, we must remember that real-wages, and most especially
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evidence on wage-rates, do not allow us to deduce levels of real income for
even the lower orders of society. Penn and Dyer (1990, p. 356) have commented
that “at least one-third of the population of late medieval England gained all
or a part of their livelihood from earning wages.”124 This statement might be
more persuasive if the word order were changed to read: “gained part or all,”
or better “part if not all” of their livelihood. Surely, those who lived strictly
by money-wages alone, and who were unable to supplement their annual
incomes from agricultural holdings, or from private gardens with urban
dwellings, and especially by practicing more than one craft, were still a minority
of late-medieval English society, if undoubtedly a rather larger proportion of
the economically more advanced Flemish society.
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NOTES
1. Wages for master building craftsmen were 22d to 24d per day from 1730–1736;
24d from 1736–1773; and rising to 29d per day from 1773 to 1776. I have also revised
the values of the sub-indexes and of the composite price index from tabulating the data
from their working sheets, in: Archives of the British Library of Political and Economic
Science [hereafter BLPES], the Phelps Brown Papers Collection.
2. See Rogers (1866, Vol. II, p. 317; and 1882, Vol. III, p. 628; Vol. IV, p. 520).
In this transition period, wages were unstable: some masons and carpenters were paid
6d, 6.5d, 6.67d, 7.0d, and a few even 8d; but the mean appears to be 6.5d in this and
the following years. With a base of 1451–1475 = 100, the Phelps Brown and Hopkins
“basket of consumables” index stood at 96.90 in 1510, and about 110.0 in 1515–1517;
but by 1536 this had risen to 164.25. The summer daily wage for master masons and
carpenters rose to 7d in 1542, and thereafter by 1/2d increments to 10d in 1559, remaining
at that rate until 1574.
3. Data from Stadsarchief Brugge, Stadsrekeningen 1331–1332 to 1475–1476; and
Algemeen Rijksarchief, Rekenkamer, doc. nos. 32,461–32,566 (1406–1513). The
policemen were paid this daily rate for the full 365 (or 366) days in the year, while the
average master mason or carpenter worked at most about 210 days a year. For wages
in Bruges, see also Sosson (1977, pp. 225–260, and graphs, pp. 300–309).
4. Wage data for Brabant taken from Verlinden and Scholliers (1959–1965, Vols.
I–II); Van der Wee (1963, Vol. I, Appendices 27–30, pp. 333–389; Van der Wee, 1975,
pp. 413–447).
5. See also Steffen (Stuttgart, 1901–1905).
6. See Van Zanden (1999, p. 192), commenting “. . . that there was no clear cut
relationship between economic development and real wage growth” (p. 192); and that
his research on real-wages “throws doubt on some of the conclusions of the optimists,”
referring in particular to De Vries (1994).
7. See Van der Wee (1975, pp. 413–447). His data show that Antwerp craftsmen
did not suffer the same deterioration in real wages as did English craftsmen during the
Price Revolution era (c.1520–c.1640), even with substantial demographic growth and
inflation in both countries.
8. On the English “Assize of Bread and Ale,” see Bland, Brown and Tawney (1914,
pp. 155–157); Ross (1956–1957); and Jones (2000, pp. 136–138). The earliest assize
dates from the twelfth century (reign of Henry I) and became the statute Assisa Panis
et Cervisie evidently in 1266 (51 Henrici III): in Tomlins and Raithby, 1810–1822, Vol.
I, pp. 199–200; and it was not abolished until 1819.
9. For the Savernak household, in Bridgport Dorset (1450s), for which foodstuffs
accounted for 80% of total expenditures, see Phelps Brown and Hopkins (1956/1981,
p. 14) and Wood-Legh (1956). See also Dyer (1983, 1988, 1989, Chapters 5–6) for
evidence on consumption patterns in late-medieval England, especially on the rising
consumption of meat and dairy products. For medieval and early-modern Flanders,
Blockmans and Prevenier (1977, p. 22) endorse weights of 70–80% for foodstuffs, 5–15%
for house rents, 5–10% for lighting and heating, and 5–10% for clothing. For the 70%
for foodstuffs: 44% for bread grains, 15% for meat and fish, and 11% for vegetables.
For Brabant, see Van der Wee (1975/1978 and 1966/1993, especially p. 284). The budget
for the Lier Infirmary, from 1526 to 1602, was allocated on average: 44% for bread,
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16% for beer, 1% for wine, 3% for fish, 20% for meat, and 10% for dairy products.
The original Dutch-language version of the article (1975, pp. 417, 436) indicated the
weights for dairy products as 4.7 kg for each of butter and cheese; but the table provides
a weight of just 4.5 kg. for each. In the English translation (1978, Table II, p. 62) the
weights are given instead as 4.8 kg for butter and 4.7 kg for cheese; and this version
was also presented in the subsequent republication of his essays (1993, p. 225).
Nevertheless these weights evidently have no bearing on the statistical values (i.e. in d
groot Brabant) provided for this sub-index.
10. A gap from 1430 to 1573, as ascertained from their working papers contained
in the Archives, BLPES, the Phelps Brown Papers Collection, Box Ia.324; and J.IV.2a.
11. Van der Wee’s reliance on just rye prices for the farinacous group (while using
barley for the drink group) may be justified on the medieval Low Countries’ preference
for rye over wheat (see n. 8 above). The omission of prices for lamp oil and shirting
in the industrial sub-index is hardly serious. A far wider range of industrial product
prices is given in Doughty (1975); but it commences only in 1401.
12. R. Allen (2001) has constructed a somewhat different basket, which may be
more useful for modern Europe, but not for medieval north-west Europe. It is also based
on commodity values and wages expressed in terms of grams of pure silver, a method
that permits international comparisons of commodity prices and wages, but one that can
be misleading, since it is based on the unrealistic assumption that commodity price
changes are proportional to changes in the silver contents of the coinages (with debase-
ment) or in market values for silver. He also compared standard Laspeyres arithmetic
indexes with geometric indexes, using the same data, and found no significant differ-
ences in trends. As he notes, “the geometric index is a weighted geometric average of
the price relatives in which the weights equal budget shares;” but Phelps Brown and
Hopkins (1956), in basing their index on budget shares, did not use the required tech-
nique to produce a true geometric index: i.e. by multiplying the price-relatives (P1/P0)
and taking the nth root of the product, in which n represents the number of years in
the series; or, more simply, by taking the sum of the natural logarithms of the individual
price-relatives in a series and dividing that sum by the number of years. The obvious
implication of an index based on fixed expenditure shares is that the quantity of grains
consumed during a period of rising relative grain prices must, in theory, fall to a greater
extent than the quantity of industrial goods, an historically unrealistic assumption.
13. For a more recent exposition, see Hatcher (1977, pp. 11–73).
14. For a general overview, see Hatcher (1977, 1986, 1994); Blanchard (1970),
Campbell (1981); Miller and Hatcher (1978, pp. 27–63). For an estimate of 4.5 million
in the 1290s, see Nightingale (1996, pp. 89–106); for the estimate of 7.2 million in
1292, see Hallam (1988, p. 536); for an estimate of 2.5–3.0 million in 1377, see Miller
(1991, p. 6).
15. The following quotations also succinctly express his fundamental views: (1)
“And price changes which are not ‘general’ but are mainly confined to grain, point to
a factor which has already been shown to have operated in the opposite direction in the
early centuries of the Middle Ages, i.e. population” (Postan, 1952, p. 213); (2) “A fall
in population would also have, so to speak, a selective effect on prices, in that it would
tend to lower the prices of agricultural products, which were previously being produced
at high and ever rising cost . . . under steeply diminishing returns. . . but would have
little effect on commodities not greatly subject to diminishing returns, i.e. most indus-
trial products.” (Postan, 1952, p. 214); (3) “. . . the movements of agricultural and
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industrial prices did not synchronize” (Postan, 1951/1973, p. 9); (4) “Butter happened
to be a semi-luxury entering into popular consumption. It is not necessary to know what
[Alfred] Marshall said about the elasticity of the demand for bread in order to conclude
that agricultural labourers were now better able to indulge in a little butter, however
expensive . . . It is therefore highly significant that the price of butter and the price of
grain diverged more widely than the prices of any other commodities [during] the four-
teenth and fifteenth centuries. [And furthermore] the prices for animal products in current
coinage actually rose [continuing from 1351] the rising trend of the previous two
centuries for another 125 years.” (Postan, 1952, pp. 209–210).
16. See Schwartz (1974, p. 253), for a review of Spooner (1972), in which she
comments that: “the author subscribes to a familiar fallacy, namely that a monetary
explanation to be valid requires that all prices move in unison.” Her verdict would be
equally valid if directed against the injudicious criticisms that Postan (1959, pp. 77–82)
directed against Robinson (1959).
17. See below, pp. 211–213 On the abandonment of land in so much of medieval
western Europe, the so-called “Wüstungen,” see in particular Abel (1966/1980, pp.
49–79, and especially pp. 80–95) and Slicher van Bath (1963, pp. 160–94).
18. As noted above, for the pre-modern era, population growth, by increasing
pressures on relatively fixed stocks of land and capital, would – in the absence of
technological changes – likely have induced diminishing returns, producing rising
marginal costs and thus rising grain prices. But such sharp rises in grain prices might
well have forced many consumers, faced with budget constraints – as argued above in
the context of monetary changes – to reduce their expenditures on other, less necessary
commodities, thus driving down their relative prices. For a similar argument, see
McCloskey (1972), in reviewing Ramsey’s collection of essays on the Price Revolution
(1971).
19. Keynes (1936, p. 300): “It is probable that the general level of prices will not
rise very much as output increases, so long as there are available efficient unemployed
resources of every type. But as soon as output has increased sufficiently to begin to
reach the “bottle-necks,” there is likely to be sharp rise in the prices of certain
commodities . . . [But] the elasticity of supply partly depends upon the elapse of time.”
For further arguments on these issues, see Munro (1991, pp. 119–183); Munro (1999),
in a review of Fischer (1996); and Munro (2003b).
20. See in particular Farmer (1983, pp. 117–155; 1988, pp. 760–778, 811–817, with
Table F; and 1991, pp. 467–490, 516–524, with Tables H and I); Clark (2001).
21. The data in Table 3 are for “hired’ and not workers ad tascam; and without
food or other payments in kind. I have not, however, found comparable examples in
other manorial accounts. Beveridge (1936, p. 30), commented that, at Taunton, wages
“are affected by the greater importance there of customary services and the best method
of presenting the [wage] series has not been determined.” But that does not satisfactorily
explain why building wages at Taunton were generally higher before the Black Death
than elsewhere. Yet if Beveridge is correct, then wages on many late-medieval English
manors would have been – to a greater or lesser degree – affected by the relative supplies
of servile labor, before and after the Black Death.
22. Farmer (1996, pp. 214–220, and Table 11.4). On the selected Winchester manors,
labor productivity on the arable fell from 34.3 acres per famuli ploughman in 1305 only
marginally to 32.3 acres in 1382, but then more precipitously to 27.9 acres per ploughman
in 1421, a 15.8% decline. In animal husbandry, the number of sheep under the care of
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a single shepherd (again chiefly famuli) rose from 231 in 1341 to 342 in 1421, a 48.1%
increase. For some corroborative evidence on Glastonbury and Ramsey manors, see also
Raftis (1996, pp. 191–206).
23. In late-medieval Flanders, weaving a standard fine woolen broadcloth of 42 ells
by 3.5 ells (29.4m by 2.45m = 72.0m2), containing 84 lb. or 38.2 kg of wool (16.3 kg
of warp and 21.8 kg of weft), typically required about 12–14 days, with two weavers
and a boy. Another dozen days of labor were expended in wool-beating, wool-greasing,
carding, combing, spinning, reeling, and warping the yarns for the same cloth, involving
about 26–30 artisans and helpers; and at least another 6–9 days in the finishing processes
of foot-fulling (three or four days per broadcloth), napping, shearing, and dyeing.
According to a Parliamentary report of the 1790s, weaving a superfine broadcloth of 34
yards (i.e. before fulling), with 80 lb. of wool (36.2 kg), then required 364 man-hours
(= 14.5 days, with two weavers and a boy), and a further 888 man-hours in wool prepa-
ration, spinning, reeling, and warping, and fulling (74 days). Fulling had been mechanized
in England (water-wheels) from the thirteenth century, and remained the only signifi-
cantly powered manufacturing process before the Industrial Revolution. See Endrei
(1981, pp. 253–262; 1983, pp. 108–119); Van Uytven (1981, pp. 283–294); Munro
(1988, pp. 693–715); Lipson (1921, Appendix I, pp. 258–259, citing Parliamentary
Papers, Vol. 23, 1840, pp. 439–441, for the years 1781–1796).
24. Such a process would have been facilitated by the increased labor mobility that
ensued from the later fourteenth century, with the breakdown of the manorial domain
economies, the consequent leasing of domain lands to peasant tenants, and the decay of
villeinage (serfdom). See Raftis (1964, pp. 129–204; 1996, pp. 291–206).
25. The Ordinance of Labourers, decreed on 14 June 1349, is restated and reissued,
with some modifications, as the Statute of Labourers, 25 Edwardi III stat 2. c. 3 (1351).
See also the so-called 1388 Statute of Cambridge (Statute 12 Ricardi II, c.3-c.5), which
stipulated the annual stipends for agricultural servants and laborers, ranging from the
Bailiff of Husbandry, at 13s 4d sterling per year, with clothing, to 6s 0d (i.e. 72d) for
“Swineherds, Women Laborers, and Deyrie Women.” Both in Tomlins and Raithby
(1810–1822, Vol. I, pp. 307–308; Vol. II, pp. 56–57). For other legislation, see also, in
Vol. I, pp. 311 (1351), 327 (1352), 350 (1357), 366 (1361), 373–375 (1362), 388 (1368);
in Vol. II, pp. 11 (1378), 32 (1383), 63 (1390), 137 (1402), 157–158 (1406), 176 (1414),
196 (1416), 225 (1423), 227 (1425), 233–235 (1427), 244 (1429), 337 (1446), 585 (1495),
637 (1497). On such legislation, see in particular Given-Wilson (2000, pp. 85–89).
26. Some manorial records, however, periodically record mowers’ and threshers’
wages both by day and by output, thus permitting some such comparisons; and other
records provide wages of sawyers and street-pavers by both quantity (piece-work) and
by day. For one exercise in using such medieval data, see Clark (2001).
27. See Statute 11 Henry VII c. 22 (1495), which authorized the payment of a higher
wage to those master masons and carpenters who supervised six or more men; the statute
was reissued in 1514–1515 as 6 Henry VIII c. 3. Both in Tomlins and Raithby
(1810–1822, Vol. II, pp. 585–587; Vol. III, pp. 124–126).
28. In the list of references, see the English archives consulted for this study, espe-
cially the Archives, BLPES, Beveridge Price and Wage History Collection; The London
Guildhall Manuscripts Library; and The Corporation of London Record Office.
29. See the previous note. Beveridge (1936, p. 34) notes that in the early thirteenth
century Southwark wages had been about the same as those paid elsewhere on the
Winchester estates.
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30. At 4d or 5d per day, at Esher, in Surrey; Witney, in Oxfordshire; Wycombe, in
Buckinghamshire; Overton and Ecchinswell (Itchingswell), in Hampshire; Taunton, in
Somerset. For a list of the manors and their locations, see Titow (1972, pp. 28–39, with
map).
31. See Hatcher (1994, pp. 13–19); Penn and Dyer (1990, pp. 356–376); Ritchie
(1934, pp. 91–112; and n. 3).
32. In the appended list of References, see the archival sources for Belgium, chiefly
town accounts; and also the published wage data in Verlinden-Scholliers (1959–1965),
and Van der Wee (1963, Vol. I, Appendices 27–30, pp. 333–392; and Synoptic Tables
of Wages, pp. 457–475).
33. Fullers, organized into guilds, also received piece-work wages, but since they
were required to full a cloth in three to five days, according to the size and quality, a
daily-wage rate can be extrapolated. Master weavers, who were actually industrial entre-
preneurs, earned their incomes as profits, while dyers and shearers, also guild-protected,
earned professional fees. See Munro (1988b, pp. 693–715; 1994a, pp. 377–388; 2002,
pp. 153–206). For the fullers’ strikes, see below, pp. 219–222.
34. See in particular Hatcher (1994); and below, pp. 211–212.
35. See nn. 20, 22 above. For the Statute of Artificers, Statute Elizabeth I c.4 see
Tomlins and Raithby (1810–1822, Vol. IV: Part i, pp. 414–422) and Bland, Brown and
Tawney (1914, pp. 325–336).
36. Discussed in much greater detail below, on pp. 210–212, 217–219 Hatcher
himself admits (1994, p. 23) that “the vast majority of the greater landlords openly paid
cash wages in excess of the unrealistic maxima specified by the law.”
37. Riley (1860, Vol. I, pp. 99–100; Vol. II, pp. 541–543; 1868, pp. 253–255);
Sharpe (1905, pp. 148, 301; 1907, p. 184). By 1349 the higher rate was already in force
at Westminster Abbey (BLPES, Beveridge Price and Wage History Collection:
Westminster Abbey).
38. Statute 11 Henry VII c. 22 (1495), in Tomlins and Raithby (1810–1822, Vol.
II, pp. 585–587). The major exception was a maximum daily rate of 7d, summer and
winter, for those senior or chief master masons and carpenters employing or supervising
six or more men; or a rate of 5d daily, with food and drink. See n. 27 above.
39. See pp. 197–198 and nn. 28–29 above.
40. Van der Wee (1963, Vol. I, Appendix 48, pp. 540–544): interpolating 208 days
for 1436). For this regression, R2 = 0.00002943; adjusted R2 = –0.01017; F = 0.002885.
41. Statute 11 Henry VII c. 22, repeated in 6 Henry VIII c. 3 (1514–1515), in
Tomlins and Raithby (1810–1822, Vol. II, pp. 585–587; Vol. III, pp. 124–126). The
framers of the 1495 statute, however, evidently believed that too many wage-earners
were stealing leisure time during working hours by “late commyng unto their worke,
erly departing therfro, long sitting at ther brekfast, dyner, and nonemete, and long type
of sleping at after none.”
42. See Campbell (1747/1969, pp. 331–341). In specifying hours of work for 380
crafts, this treatise indicated that the typical working day still remained a very long one:
from 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. (or during all “daylight” hours). Subsequently, the 1833
Factory Act had stipulated a maximum working day of nine hours for children, aged
nine to thirteen; and for those aged thirteen to eighteen, a maximum of 69 hours a week,
with no more than 12 hours per day. The 1844 Factory Act limited the working day for
women to 12 hours per day, and for children aged eight to thirteen, to 6.5 hours. Fielden’s
Act, imposing a limit of ten hours per day for both women and men (implicitly), was
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passed at a time of great labor unrest, on the eve of the 1848 Chartists’s Revolt. See
Clapham (1964, pp. 572–578); Checkland (1964, pp. 244–249); Derry (1963, pp.
124–137, 151–154). In the U.S., New Hampshire’s state legislature also enacted, in the
same year 1847, a maximum ten-hour day; but the legislation applied only to women,
and proved to be unenforceable. The effective state legislation dates only from 1887.
See Goldin (1990, pp. 189–192, and Table 7.1); Atack and Passell (1994, pp. 542–544).
43. See Sosson (1977, p. 149, n. 41), citing guild statutes in Rijksarchief Brugge,
Ambachten, no. 1, fo. 62: “dat hi sculdich es te werkene van nuchtens toten avonde
alzo wel tsaterdaechs up vighelie avond als up anderen daghen . . .” Similarly the Bruges
carpenters guild forbade them “te weerkene . . . by avonde of bi nachte met keersen
[candles].” See other guild records that specify working hours in the textile trades (forbid-
ding work by night), in Delepierre and Willems (1842); Espinas and Pirenne
(1906–1924); Joossen (1935).
44. See n. 37 above: for the London ordinance of 1350, setting maximum summer
and winter daily rates (at 6d and 5d respectively).
45. See Table 1. The subsequent Statutes of 1444 and 1495 did more clearly specify
a winter maximum wage, lower than the stipulated summer wage. In London, and
possibly also in Bruges, seasonality reappeared, after the 1440s in the form of a slightly
higher summer wage. See sources in nn. 27, 37–38, 41, and 46 above.
46. In 1441: by reducing the uniform daily rate to 7.5d (or even to 7.0d for some)
for the winter season (three months), while raising it to 8.5d for the rest of the year.
(Corporation of London Record Office, London Bridgemaster’s Accounts, Weekly
Payments, First Series, Vol. IV. Unfortunately these accounts cease in 1445). See also
Knoop and Jones (1967, pp. 105–106).
47. See below, p. 224. For accounts of wage payments in Bruges, see: Stadsarchief
van Brugge, Stadsrekeningen 1424–1425 to 1467–1468. Before the 1440s, there are only
occasional and sporadic indications of seasonal wages. On the other hand, some wage
differences were clearly not seasonal in nature: thus some master masons and carpen-
ters were paid 12d per day in December 1435, February 1436, December 1437, while
some were paid 10d daily in June and September 1437, May and September 1438 (and
thereafter to April 1444), in May and September 1446. Subsequent accounts, however,
are explicit that winter wages were “paid before Easter” (in particular, the accounts of
1458–1459 and 1460–1461, specifying a winter wage of 10d rate for street-pavers). For
seasonal wages Bruges from this period, or ca. 1450, see Sosson (1977, pp. 225–228,
and 300–304, Figs 12–16). For Holland, see in particular De Vries (1978, pp. 79–97;
and 1994, pp. 47–63). For England, see Thorold Rogers (1866, Vols I–II; and 1882,
Vols III–IV); Phelps Brown and Hopkins (1955/1981, pp. 1–12).
48. See pp. 196–197 above; and the other archival sources listed in References. On
this question, see in particular Beveridge (1936, pp. 36–37): “that in the Winchester
manors there is no reason for suspecting any general practice of supplementation,” not
disclosed in the records, which record separately payments in cash (stipendium) and in
kind (corredia, allocationes). He also notes that “vadia (originally cash payment in place
of allowance) is used as a term interchangeable with stipendium (cash payment exclu-
sive of allowance) and is invariably at or about the same level . . ..”
49. Archives, BLPES, Beveridge Price and Wage Collection, Battle Abbey: Alciston
Manor, 1336–1487 (Boxes H.10–11).
50. Archives, BLPES, Beveridge Price and Wage Collection, Westminster Abbey:
1393–1541 (Box P.10).
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51. See the archival sources for Belgium in the list of References; and also Van der
Wee (1963, Vol. I, Appendices 27–30, pp. 333–392; and Synoptic Tables of Wages, 
pp. 457–475); Verlinden and Scholliers (1959–1965).
52. See, for example, in Posthumus (1910, Vol. I, pp. 90–91, 161, 621–622,
653–666) documents nos. 74. 111–113 (March 1415); no. 132.VI.9 (1436/1437); no.
508: 10–13 (Nov. 1478); no. 525: 23–225 (Dec. 1478). Inter alia, these ordinances
stipulated that: “ende die meester sal gehouden wesen sijn volle gelt te nemen van elc
laken . . . dat die drapenieres hoir volres hoir volle loen geven sullen, ende alle Saterdages
hoir gelt geven sullen, sonder horen volres enigerhande dinck te vercopen, te weten
kairden, groff wolle laken, bier, broot, sout, gort, kairssen, seep, butter noch kase” 
(no. 508:13, p. 623); and, “die betalingen sel wesen mit ghelde ende mit gheerehande
wair of andere goeden . . .” (no. 525:24, p. 653).
53. See the archival sources for Belgium in the list of References. On this issue,
for early modern England, see also Woodward (1981, pp. 28–46; 1994, pp. 11–21; and
1995).
54. For both quotations, see Wilton and Prescott (1987, p. 214).
55. See Huberman (1986, 1991 and 1996).
56. See also Wilton and Prescott (1987, p. 215), in commenting on “the very deep
recession of 1982,” when the International Woodworkers “resisted wage cuts at sawmills
in British Columbia. The union took the view that if the weakest firms succeeded in
getting wage concessions in order to maintain employment, then all firms would demand
the same concessions and all workers would suffer. Moreover, the union would have 
to fight battles already won in order to restore wage and benefit levels once market
conditions improved;” and thus “wage cuts were resisted and many sawmills were
closed.”
57. See Munro (2002); Boone, Brand and Prevenier (1993); Boone and Brand (1993);
Brand and Stabel (1995).
58. See in particular Postan (1950; 1951; 1972, pp. 31–35); and especially Postan
and Titow (1959/1973, pp. 150–185, which presents evidence to indicate rising death
rates from heriots, or “death-duties” levied on customary peasant holdings (usually in
the form of livestock). For other evidence on rising demographic pressures, especially
fragmentation of holdings, though not conclusive evidence for a Malthusian crisis, see
Miller and Hatcher (1978, pp. 53–63); Campbell (1984), Smith (1984, 1991, pp. 25–77);
Bailey (1998); Poos (1985; 1991, pp. 9–57, 89–130); and for peasant difficulties in
paying increased royal taxes, see Maddicott (1975, pp. 1–75). For the “Great Famine”
itself, see Lucas (1930); Kershaw (1973), and especially Jordan (1996, pp. 24–150).
59. Postan (1951, p. 14; and also Postan, 1950, pp. 186–214; 1972, pp. 27–39).
60. Poos (1985; 1991, pp. 89–130).
61. Herlihy (1967, pp. 55–77); Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber (1985, pp. 232–279);
Munro (1991, pp. 139–148); Harvey (1991, pp. 1–24).
62. Smith (1991, pp. 1–23); see also Harvey (1966, pp. 23–42), with a much stronger
attack on Postan’s thesis, denying any evidence of population decline before the Black
Death; and also Hallam (1988, pp. 508–593), casting further doubts on general popula-
tion decline before 1348.
63. Herlihy (1967, pp. 122–125).
64. That is: if the aggregate decline in West European net national income was
greater than any change in the volume of money payments: if  y >  (M.V) ⇒ P ↓ .
See Robinson (1959; and Postan’s “Note,” pp. 77–82, which is not a valid response);
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Spufford (1988, pp. 267–282) ; Nef (1952, 1987); Kovacevic (1960, pp. 248–258);
Braunstein (1983, pp. 573–591); Westermann (1986, pp. 187–211); Munro (1991,
2003b). See also pp. 214–215 below.
65. See also Patterson (1972); Munro (1983, pp. 97–126).
66. Ames (1965), Prestwich (1977), Mate (1975), Robinson (1959), Spufford (1988,
pp. 267–288).
67. The fall in the bimetallic ratio may have been due to both declining silver outputs
from Bohemian mines and increasing supplies of West African (Sudanese) and Hungarian
gold. See Lane (1977, pp. 52–59); Spufford (1986, graph 3 and Table II, pp. li–lxiii;
and 1988, pp. 267–288, 340–342). Spufford’s dates have been adjusted by those of Lane
(1977). See also Mate (1978).
68. An absence of minting may indicate only that the nation’s mints were offering
a mint price for bullion uncompetitive with those of neighbouring foreign mints. 
With coinage debasement in a bimetallic system (in England, after 1344), a coinage
debasement in, say, silver might succeed in recoining much of the current silver
monetary stock, in inducing dishoarding, and in attracting foreign bullion, but at the
expense of losing the now “disfavoured’ gold to foreign mints. See the essays in
Munro (1994). See Fig. 1; and Munro (1984, Table A-1, p. 86): regressing
quinquennial mean current prices against corresponding mint output values (current
moneys) in these two regions, see for 1350–1409: R2 = 0.4327 (t statistic: 2.762,
significant at the 2.00% level); for 1350–1499: R2 = 0.2697 (t-statistic: 1.455,
significant only at the 15.71% level).
69. Mayhew (1987, Table I, p. 125): indicating that the coined money supply
contracted from about £1,100,00 sterling in 1311–1324 to just £500,000 in the 1340s.
See Mayhew (1995, 1974); and sources in nn. 67–68 above. For a more recent estimate,
see: M. Allen (2000; 2001), indicating (Table 1 in M. Allen, 2001, p. 603) a larger esti-
mated coined silver stock of £1,900,000 – £2,300,000 in 1319, falling to about £700,000
– £900,000 in 1351. See also Table 2, p. 607, providing, for 1470, an estimate of just
£350,000 to £450,000 in silver, £400,000 to £500,000 in gold, and thus a total of no
more than £750,000 to £950,000.
70. Phelps Brown and Hopkins (1955, p. 11); Thorold Rogers (1866, 1882); and the
list of References for the Beveridge Price and Wage History collection (see nn. 48–50
above). Wages for masons and carpenters at the Oxford colleges did not fall, however;
but remained at the daily rate of 4d set from at least 1300.
71. Money wages for master masons and carpenters were typically 3d per day from
before 1264 to 1302; for many, 3.5d until 1310; and then 4d until 1338. See nn. 2,
20–21, 28–29, and n. 78 below.
72. For other analyses of medieval English wages before and after the Black Death,
see in particular Farmer (1981, 1983, 1988, 1991), whose conclusion do not always
match my own. For the more general economic and social consequences of the Black
Death, see: Hatcher (1977, 1986, 1994); Platt (1996, pp. 1–47, 177–192); Bolton (1996,
pp. 17–78); Putnam (1908); Poos (1991, pp. 218–221).
73. Statute 25 Edwardi III stat. 2 c. 3, in Tomlins and Raithby (1810–1822, Vol. I,
pp. 311–312). See also n. 25 and pp. 196, 199–200 above. Wages for the winter season
from Michaelmas to Easter were not specifically stipulated, except that they were to be
“less according to the rate and discretion of the justices.” For a discussion of this Statute,
and the subsequent labor legislation, see Farmer (1991, pp. 483–490); Given-Wilson
(2000, pp. 85–90); Putnam (1908).
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74. Statute 23 Henrici VI c. 12, in Tomlins and Raithby (1810–1822, Vol. II, pp.
337–339). See above p. 210.
75. See above p. 200. As also noted there, these rates were just 1d per day higher
than those of 1290.
76. Archives, BLPES, Beveridge Price History Collection, Box P9.
77. See Beveridge (1955–1956, pp. 26–28): commenting on “the failure of the Black
Death to cause any immediate change of [wage] rates” in the Winchester manorial
accounts of 1349–1350.
78. For this and the following, see: Archives, BLPES, Beveridge Price and Wage
History Collection, Box H:10–11). At Battle Abbey, carpenters and masons had their
pay raised from 4d to 5d daily in 1425; at Ecchinswell (Itchingswell) (Box A.33:159432),
from 1433; but at Overton (Box A.33:159406), and Wycombe (BoxA.33:159407) first
carpenters and then masons enjoyed the same increase from 4d to 5d as early as
1401–1405. At the urban Winchester College (Box F.8), wages for master carpenters
had risen to 6d per day without food by 1398 (4d daily with food); but for master
masons, the mean rate did not reach 6d daily (without food) until 1409. See also 
the raw-wage data published in Thorold Rogers (1866, Vol. II, pp. 272–334; and 1882,
Vol. III, pp. 583–663).
79. As also noted above, on p. 194, the wages of occasional day laborers, chiefly
agricultural, on Taunton manor, after doubling in the years following the Black Death
(1349–1356), then fell to the pre-Plague level of 1d daily, remaining there until
1412–1413. See Table 7.
80. Ritchie (1934): data from presentments before Justices of the King’s Bench at
Brentwood in November 1389, following the 1388 Statute of Cambridge. As she also
notes (p. 102), “eight hundred men who were receiving illegally high wages is not a
large number for a country the size of Essex.” She also noted daily wage payments of
4d with food, for tasks in the Winchester manorial accounts that are specifically listed
as “without food’. See also Poos (1991, pp. 218–221); Penn and Dyer (1990).
81. Corporation of London Record Office, Bridgemaster’s Accounts, Weekly
Payment Series, Vols III–IV; Corporation of London Record Office, London
Bridgemaster’s Accounts, Weekly Payments, First Series, Vol. IV. Subsequently, from
1441, the craftsmen employed by the Tower Bridgemaster received a very minor seasonal
adjustment in wages: a reduction in the daily rate for a now shorter winter season, to
7.5d but an increase to 8.5d for the rest of the year, thus slightly increasing the annual
wage payments. Unfortunately these accounts cease in 1445. See also Knoop and Jones
(1967, pp. 105–106).
82. For Flanders, see Munro (1981, 1983, 1984a, b); for Tuscany, see Herlihy (1967,
pp. 122–125).
83. For this study, for both England and the Low Countries, the tables on real-wages
present data in quinquennial means, which are calculated as both arithmetic and harmonic
means. For both the annual data, within each quinquennium, are computed in the stan-
dard fashion as: RWI = NWI/CPI (nominal wage index divided by the consumer price
index for each year). The arithmetic mean is calculated by computing the sum of the
five annual data in each quinquennium, and not by dividing the quinquennial mean of
the NWI by that for the CPI (which would produce an entirely false result). The harmonic
means is the reciprocal of the arithmetic mean of the reciprocals of the individual values
(index numbers of commodity baskets) in each quinquennium (or series); and it is the
better measure of the average number of units that could be purchased with a given sum
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of money. Its formula is: H = 1/[3 (1/r1 + 1/r2 + 1/r3 + . . . 1/rn)]/N. Note that the harmonic
mean is always less than the arithmetic mean (and also less than the geometric mean).
See Mills (1956, pp. 108–109 and 395–324, for index numbers using these means; and
also n.12 above). See above, however, on pp. 189–190 some reasons why these indexes
probably exaggerate the rise in real wages during periods of falling grain prices and
their fall during periods of rising grain prices, particularly though with sticky wages.
84. Archives, BLPES, Beveridge Price and Wage History Collection, boxes A.31
(Taunton), A.32 (Esher), A. 33 (Ecchinswell/Itchingswell, Overton, Wycombe), F.8
(Winchester College), G.14 (Hinderclay and Redgrave), H.10–11 (Battle Abbey).
85. See Feavearyear (1963, pp. 15–45); Munro (1979, 1981, 1983a, 1983b, 1984a,
1984b, 1988a, 1992); Fournial (1970); and Cazelles (1966).
86. See in particular: Miskimin (1975, pp. 25–32); Herlihy (1967, pp. 55–71,
180–212); Lopez (1962, pp. 29–52); Munro (1983a, pp. pp. 115–120); Boccaccio
(1353/1921: introduction, esp. p. 7); Cassell (1983, pp. 277–290).
87. Herlihy (1967, pp. 128–130); Hamilton (1936, statistical appendices).
88. Unfortunately, the Flemish “basket of consumables” index contains only one
industrial commodity, in this period (Table 1): cheap strijptelaken (rayed cloth) from
Ghent (supplemented with cheap voeringlaken from 1401). Graphs of some prices for
building materials during this period are contained in Sosson (1977, pp. 289–293): 
no. 1, for paving stones: very few data, but with a sharp decline in the later 1390s; no. 2,
for bricks: decline in late 1380s, rise in early 1390s, then decline (to 1405); no. 3: for
slates, decline in early 1390s, then rise, then decline, from 1400 to c. 1410; no. 4, 
for lime: sharp decline in early 1390s, then stable; no. 5, for solder: stable; and iron: severe
fluctuations. For a similar graph, though only for solder and iron prices, see also Thoen
(1988, Vol. I, Fig. 16, p. 255).
89. The sources of the mint data used in these tables, for England and the Low
Countries, may be found in: Munro (1973, Appendix I, pp. 188–211; 1981, pp. 71–116;
1983, pp. 127–158; 1984, pp. 71, 86–111); Crump and Johnson (1913); Brooke and
Stokes (1929); Challis (1992, pp. 83–178, 179–397; and Appendix 1, pp. 673–698).
90. The arguments are summarized in Nef (1941, 1952); Graus (1951); Miskimin
(1964; 1975, pp. 25–72, 132–157); Lopez, Miskimin, and Udovitch (1970); Day (1978);
Munro (1983a, pp. 97–112); Spufford (1988, pp. 267–288, 340–342).
91. Ashtor (1971; 1976, pp. 319–331). See also Day (1978); Munro (1983a); and
nn. 93–94, 96.
92. The two sets of technological revolutions were, first, in mechanical engineering:
adits and mechanical pumps to permit much deeper, well drained, mining shafts; and
then in chemical engineering: the Seiger- or Saigerhüttenprozess, for smelting argentif-
erous-cupric ores with lead to separate the two metals. See Nef (1941; 1952, pp.
691–761); Braunstein (1983); Westermann (1972, 1986); Spufford (1988, pp. 363–377);
Munro (1991, 2003a, b).
93. See Spufford (1988, p. 347): “many contemporary European observers believed
that ‘thesaurisation’ [hoarding, the accumulation of plate] was the main cause of the
bullion famines” during the later fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries; but he also
comments (pp. 346–347) that: “In retrospect it appears that it was itself in part a response
to the famine. Nevertheless it made that shortage worse . . . .”
94. See Thompson (1956, pp. xxxvi–xlix and p. 163), stating that “the reigns of 
the three Edwards [1272–1377] are, with the exception of the Civil Wars of Charles I, the
most prolific in coin-finds since the Romano-British era. This is due primarily to a 
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period of continual unrest and bad economic conditions which encouraged an abnormal
amount of hoarding.” But elsewhere (p. xvi) he suggests that it is “not a safe assump-
tion” to attribute all coins hoards to such reasons. Many of the fourteenth-century hoards
are related to the continuing Scottish wars. Of the 394 coin hoards in the British Isles
from c.600 to 1500, 85 can be dated to the reigns of Edward II, Edward III, and Richard
II (1307–1399), with 14 in the period 1377–1399. See M. Allen (1999) for an updated
list of fourteenth-century coin hoards: 36 for 1330–1351 (and another 40 in Scotland);
16 for 1351–1412; and only 12 for 1412–1464. Such coin hoard evidence seems there-
fore to provide better evidence for the deflation of c. 1327–1343, weaker evidence for
the deflation of 1377–1410, and virtually none for the deflation era of c.1440–1470.
Nevertheless, while the absolute number of extant hoards declines in the late fourteenth
and early fifteenth centuries, population and coinage outputs declined to a much greater
extent, thus reducing the likely incidence of hoards. The survival of specific hoards may
be accidental; and money hoarded in one period was undoubtedly dishoarded and spent
in some ensuing period (thus eliminating the evidence of the hoard). For the fifteenth-
century Low Countries, see Spufford (1970, pp. 55–73; Appendix D, pp. 203–213).
95. See Miskimin (1975, pp. 92–104; 134–144); Huizinga (1926, pp. 140–152);
Piponnier (1970, Chapters. 7–10); Geijer (1979, pp. 141–155); Stuard (1999, pp.
215–242); Lopez (1962, pp. 19–32). In or about 1500, a Venetian visitor wrote a memoir
about England, in which he stated, with some considerable wonder, that “there is no
small innkeeper, however poor and humble he may be, who does not serve with silver
dishes and drinking cups; and no one, who has not in his house silver plate to the amount
of at least £100 sterling, . . . is considered by the English to be a person of any conse-
quence.” Sneyd (1847, pp. 28–29).
96. See also Mate (1978), Mayhew (1995), and M. Allen (2001, Table 2, p. 607).
97. See Munro (1979, pp. 194–196; 1994, pp. 147–195 and 204–208; 2000, 2001);
De Roover (1948, pp. 130, 236–246, 331–357, esp. pp. 339–342); Van der Wee (1963,
vol. II, pp. 85–86, 333–340, 355–358; 1977, pp. 302, 312, 323–324, 361–362; 2000,
pp. 87–112, 125–133); Nightingale (1990).
98. For deflation in late-fourteenth and early fifteenth-century Tuscany, see also
Herlihy (1967, pp. 125–130).
99. See also Beveridge (1955, pp. 18–35); Bridbury (1973, pp. 582–586).
100. Bridbury’s thesis evidently rests upon the assumption that England was so over-
populated before the Black Death that the entire agrarian economy suffered from massive
disguised unemployment, with a negative marginal product for labor. Not only is that
thesis untenable, but it is contradicted by the arguments and evidence posed in his
subsequent article (Bridbury, 1977).
101. Many of the arguments that follow could just as well pertain to the so-called
“Great Depression” era of severe deflation and rapidly rising real wages from 1873 to
1896. See in particular Feinstein (1990), MacKinnon (1994), and Saul (1985).
102. Van Werveke (1938); Munro (1973, pp. 43–74; and appendices, pp. 187–214;
1981, pp. 78–95; 1983, pp. 112–126). See also other monetary studies in Munro (1992).
103. According to the monetary formula for a renforcement, which involves recip-
rocal changes: [1/(1 + x)] – 1, where x = the percentage change in the silver content of
the groot (gros). Thus [1/(1.316) – 1] = 0.760 – 1 = –0.240 or 24.0%. See Munro (1988,
pp. 389–392, 417–418).
104. Stadsarchief Brugge, Stadsrekeningen 1388/1389 to 1399/1400: wage payments
for building craftsmen in the “werken” accounts.
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105. Gilliodts-van Severen (1871–1878, vol. III, no. 706, pp. 134–135, 140–142: for
January 1390); Van Werveke (1931, pp. 1–15; 1938, pp. 336–347); De Roover (1948,
pp. 227–229); Van der Wee (1963, Vol. II, pp. 14–18, 29–30).
106. In 1383, during the Artevelde revolt (1379–1385) and just before the initial,
abortive renforcement of 1384, the daily wages of Bruges master craftsmen in the
building trades had been reduced even more sharply, from 12d to 8d groot, but were
raised to 9.33d in 1386 and then fully restored to 12d in 1387. In 1386, just after the
suppression of the Artevelde revolt, the daily wages of Bruges policemen had been
raised from 6d to 7.67d (7d 16 mites) groot, but were restored to 6d in 1387. Note
again that the policemen’s daily wages were paid for a 365-day year. Data extracted
from the Bruges municipal accounts: Stadsarchief Brugge, Stadsrekeningen 1382/1383
to 1397/1398. Unfortunately the Ghent wage accounts are far too sparse to permit similar
comparisons, and Ypres’ stadsrekeningen now survive only from 1406 in the second
copy deposited at the Lille Chambre des Comptes (now in the Algemeen Rijksarchief
België). For Bruges policemen, see below pp. 222–223.
107. For some evidence on nominal-wage reductions during this same deflationary
era (c.1380-c.1430), and on the difficulties in interpreting the published evidence, see
pp. 226–227.
108. See in particular, Fris (1907, pp. 421–459); Nicholas (1987; 1988; 1992, pp.
273–323); Boone and Brand (1993, pp. 168–192); Boone, Brand, and Prevenier (1993,
pp. 59–74); Brand and Stabel (1995, pp. 203–224); Munro (1994a, pp. 377–388; and
2002, pp. 153–206).
109. Text of 4 September 1373 in Rijksarchief Van Oost-Vlaanderen, Oostenrijks
Fonds, layette 1; provisions also repeated in layette 2 (2 May 1423). See also Espinas
and Pirenne (1906–1924, vol. II, pp. 526–527): doc. no. 485, ordinances banning strikes;
no. 491, pp. 533–535: letters of the deken of weavers guild submitting the dispute with
fullers to arbitration; no. 492, pp. 535–537: Ghent fullers seek the count’s pardon, who
then awards a wage of 45d per maerclaken. In January 1386, after their real wage had
deteriorated by 20% since just 1382 (as measured by this Flemish price index, in Table
8), the fullers’ peaceful request for another increase now encountered a very hostile
reaction from Count Louis’ successor, Duke Philip the Bold. Fully supporting the drapers,
he curtly told the fullers “to be content” with their current wage, and furthermore decreed
that henceforth any foreign fullers would be free to establish fulleries within Ghent.
Duke Philip also rebuffed the fullers’ demands for a change in their guild constitution.
Algemeen Rijksarchief, Trésor de Flandre, Series I, no. 2208; also published in Bartier
and Van Nieuwenhuysen (1965, Vol. I, no. 88, pp. 123–124). See also Boone (1990, 
pp. 133–134).
110. Rates deduced from texts in Espinas and Pirenne (1906–1924, Vol. II, no. 492,
pp. 535–537); Algemeen Rijksarchief, Trésor de Flandre, Series I, no. 2208; and
especially Rijksarchief van Oost Vlaanderen te Gent, Oostenrijks Fonds, layette 2 (for
2 May 1423): “desquelz [desdiz foulons] ils n’avoient et ne leur en vouloit en baillier
que trente deux gros . . . et est salaire trop petit . . .” See also Van Werveke (1931, pp.
4–14); Nicholas (1987, p. 130); and the following note. Fullers’s wage data for other
Flemish and Dutch drapery towns indicates that, on average, each journeyman received
35% of the wage, leaving 30% for the master (who, of course, received revenues from
several similarly manned fulling vats).
111. De Sagher (1951–1966, Vol. III, pp. 445–446, 451–452, no. 553, and p. 468,
no. 554:136). The two journeymen were to receive 14d groot each and the master 7d,
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for a total of 35d per cloth in three days. The journeymen were also to receive another
1.25d groot (16d parisis) for scrubbing the cloths. The Wervik dickedinnen broadcloth
was to be 38 ells by 9.5 quarter ells on the loom, about the same size as the Ghent
dickedinnen.
112. Again thanks to intervention from Count Louis de Male. Algemeen Rijksarchief,
Trésor de Flandre, Series I, no. 1103; partly published in Espinas and Pirenne (1906–1924,
Vol. I, no. 206, pp. 668–669); and in Bartier-Van Nieuwenhuysen (1965, Vol. I, no. 253,
pp. 385–386). The only previous wage datum is for a wage increase to 15d 4 mites
(15.167d) in 1348; in 1349, that wage represented 31.35 g of silver and 0.238 unit of a
basket of consumables (priced at 63.69d gros, in Table 12). The new wage set at 41d groot
in 1374, represented 45.67 g silver and 0.304 basket (priced at 134.90d groot).
113. Algemeen Rijksarchief, Trésor de Flandre, Series I, no. 1103; partly published
in Espinas and Pirenne (1906–24, Vol. I, no. 206, pp. 668–669; and in Bartier-Van
Nieuwenhuysen (1965, Vol. I, no. 253, pp. 385–386): “les diz drapiers disans que ce
estoit trop grand salaire et qu’ilz devoient estre contens de xxxii [32] gros, attendu que
au temps de la dicte ordonnance [1373–1374, of Louis de Male] la monnoie estoit plus
feble que elle n’est de present, car le franc d’or valoit pour lors xxxvii [37] gros ou
environ et aujourduy il ne vault que xxxiii [33], et selonc ce que la dicte monnoie estoit
plus forte le salaire des diz foulons devoit estre diminue . . .” (In fact the Flemish silver
coinage of 1374 had been stronger than that of 1390). The Flemish gold noble had been
revalued to 6s 0d or 72d groot, from 8s 6d or 102d.
114. The Flemish price index used here (1451–1475 = 100), fell from the peak of
124.72 in 1386–1390, reflecting the debasements of those years, to a trough of just 88.51
in 1391–1395 and was virtually at that same level (88.53) in 1401–1405. The renforce-
ment reduced the traite – the coined value of a kilogram of pure silver – from £5.337
to £4.050 groot Flemish; expressed in terms of the increase in grams of silver in the
coinage (0.315g) the change becomes : [(1.00 + 0.316)/1] – 1 = 0.7599 – 1 = –0.2401 or
– 24%. See Tables B-1 and B-3 in Munro (1984a, pp. 96, 100).
115. Stadsarchief Brugge, Stadsrekeningen 1384–1385 to 1399/1400: from the
construction werken accounts.
116. See in particular: Hatcher (1996, pp. 237–272); Nightingale (1997, pp. 631–656);
Van der Wee (1963, Vol. II, pp. 61–73; 1975, pp. 203–221); Munro (1983, pp. 235–250;
1994; 1995, pp. 37–60; 1999, pp. 1–74. For a contrary view and then more nuanced
views see Van Uytven (1961, 1966, 1992, 1995).
117. For an explanation see Sosson (1977, pp. 51–55, 225–227). Unfortunately, there
are almost no continuous wage series for Ghent. For the few available for the fifteenth
century, see Verlinden and Scholliers (1959–1965, Vol. II, part i, pp. 386–397, 409–428),
generally in the same range as those at Bruges.
118. Algemeen Rijksarchief België, Rekenkamer, Stadsrekeningen Aalst, registers 
nos 31,412–431, 520.
119. The summer wage prevailed for nine months; the winter wage, for three months.
In neighbouring Mechelen most master masons and some carpenters had their daily
summer wage increased from 8d to 10d groot Brabant by 1420 (Stadsarchief Mechelen,
Stadsrekeningen nos. 86–97). In 1434, with the monetary reform, it was increased again
to 12d per day; but Antwerp master masons did not receive that same daily wage until
1443. Thus, Mechelen master masons maintained a higher level of real wages than did
their Antwerp counterparts during this period: with a decline in the seasonally adjusted
annual money wage for Mechelen masons, in terms of equivalent commodity baskets,
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from a harmonic mean of 9.513 baskets in 1421–1425 to 8.280 baskets in 1436–1440
(See Tables 13–14).
120. Note that, for both the Antwerp and Mechelen masons, the number of commodity
baskets that could have been purchased with their annual money wage income has been
computed by assigning nine months (157.5 days) to the summer wage and thus three
months (52.5 days) to the lower winter wage. See Tables 13–14 and their sources.
121. For other examples given by Beveridge (1936, 1955), for the Westminster and
Winchester manors (especially Hinderclay) in the 1390s: a fall in the mean wage of
threshers from 9.50d to 8.88d per three-rased quarters; and for reapers, from 17.13d to
14.96d per acre, from 1380–1389 to 1390–1399. From the tables presented in all these
published sources, I had constructed a working-table with 40 wage groups for the years
1380–1400; and the data suggest that 32 of the 40 groups experienced at least some
nominal-wage reductions: 20 in the 1380s and 22 in the 1390s, and thus 12 over both
decades. But the unweighted decennial means of the 40 money-wage series fell 3.6%
overall. For reasons indicated on p. 197 above, concerning the computation of decen-
nial mean wage rates, this possibly dubious working-table is not being published here.
122. See above pp. 200–202 and Blanchard (1978) for the discussion of a possibly
backward-bending supply curve of labor during this late-medieval era.
123. The elasticity of substitution sKL is the ratio of the proportional changes in the
marginal products of land+capital (yK) and labor (yL). Conversely, if K increases
relatively to L, and if the proportional increase in K/L exceeds the proportional fall in
the ratio of the marginal products of land-capital and of labor – i.e. if SKL > 1, then the
share of the national income accruing to these increased factors K will also rise. For
mathematical proof, with the CES Production Function, see Layard and Walters (1978,
pp. 63–68, 270–276). See also Phelps Brown and Hart (1952/1981, pp. 106–130): “when
big changes occur in money wage rates, the accompanying changes in the share of wages
[of national income] are relatively small;” and “a main cause of the long-period change
in the share of wages has been simply the change in the relative number of wage earners.”
124. They cite in particular Hilton (1985, pp. 253–267); and more recently Dyer
(2000, p. 24) has made an even bolder claim: that “by the end of the thirteenth century
the lowest estimate for those mainly dependent on employment by others is 50 per cent.”
But another recent estimate provides quite a contrary view: that in the early fourteenth
century, a typical English smallholder peasant, with 18 acres, could find wage-paying
employment, outside his holding, for only about 27 days per year; or 80 days for three
adult peasants on one holding. See Kitsikopoulos (2000, p. 243); and also Bailey (1998).
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